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Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al 
p J Lawrence 
New Case Filed 
Filing: A1 - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Owens, James, 
Vernon & Weeks Receipt number: 057077 4 
Dated: 06/27/2003 Amount: $77.00 (Check) 
Summons Issued 
Ex Parte Motion For Temporary Restraining 
Order 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion 
For Temporary Restraining Order 
Temporary Restraining Order 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 57 4049 Dated 
07/25/2003 for 3000.00) 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit Of Service/Brenda J. Lawrence /July 28, John T. Mitchell 
2003 
Affidavit Of Service/Found/Douglas John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence/July 28, 2003 
Filing: 17 A - Civil Answer Or Appear. All Other John T. Mitchell 
Actions No Prior Appearance Paid by: Ian Smith 
Receipt number: 0575516 Dated: 08/06/2003 
Amount: $47.00 (Check) 
Notice Of Appearance ONLY 
Notice of Substitution Of Counsel (Samuel 
Eismann sub in for Ian Smith for Defendants) 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel 
Notice Of Deposition of Harold Funk 
Notice Of Appearance (Douglas Lawrence, Pro 
Se) 
Notice Of Appearance ( Brenda Lawrence, Pro 
Se) 
Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued 
Affidavit Of Retention 
Inactivity Order Printed - File Sent to Judge 
ORDER OF RETENTION 
Case status changed: reopened 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 09/14/2004 04:00 PM) 
Notice Of Hearing 
Affidavit of Harold Funk 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks John T. Mitchell 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Motion For Summary Judgment 
Docket No. 43082 
John T. Mitchell 
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Fi dicial District Court Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Judge: Steve Verby 































Notice Of Appearance for Defendant 
Motion for Enlargement 
Affidavit of John P Whelan 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Daniel E Rebeor in Support of Motion John T. Mitchell 
for Temporary Restraining Order 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/14/2004 04:00 PM: Continued 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 11/09/2004 04:00 PM) 
Notice Of Service 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Answer, Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial John T. Mitchell 
Amended Notice Of Hearing -- 11-9-04 @ 4:00 John T. Mitchell 
pm 
Certificate Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
FILE #2 Created John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Summary Judgment 
Amended Notice Of Service 
Answer To Counterclaim 
Request For Judicial Notice 
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Tower Asseet Sub, INC. 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan Regarding failure to 
secure and affd from Human Synergistics 
Request For Judicial Notice Hearing Date 
11-09-04 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Request for Judicial Notice John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Strike John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 11/09/2004 04:00 PM: Hearing Held 
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered John T. Mitchell 
Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, John T. Mitchell 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, Plaintiff. 
order date: 11/9/2004 
Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered John T. Mitchell 
DIXON 
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Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai 
ROA Report 
CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: 
Tower Asset Sub etal. vs. Douglas P etal. 
vs. p Brenda Lawrence 
User 
ROHRBACH File sent to Judge to have counsel prepare an 
Order 
JANUSCH Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment & 
Entering Decree of Quiet Title 
VICTORIN Filing: T -Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0658480 
Dated: 07/07/2005 Amount: $9.00 (Check) 
VICTORIN Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 658482 Dated 
07/07/2005 for 100.00) 
VICTORIN Appealed To The Supreme Court 
JANUSCH Case status changed: closed pending clerk 
action 
LEITZKE Notice of Lodging Transcript 
LEITZKE Bond Converted (Transaction number 9489500 
dated 09/08/2005 amount 100.00) 
LEITZKE Receipt Of Transcript (Susan Weeks) 
LEITZKE Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copies Of 
Transcripts For Appeal Per Page Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0667858 Dated: 
09/20/2005 Amount: $153.75 (Check) 
User: DIXON 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
LEITZKE Miscellaneous Payment: Appeal Transcript Cover John T. Mitchell 
Paid by: John Whelan Receipt number: 0667858 
Dated: 09/20/2005 Amount: $18.55 (Check) 
JREYNOLDS Receipt for Records John T. Mitchell 
VICTORIN Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 3,000.00) John T. Mitchell 
PARKER Supreme Court Opinion John T. Mitchell 
ROBINSON Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:00 PM) Set W/CV02-7671 
CLAUSEN Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 06/13/2007 03:00 PM) set 
W/CV02-7671 -Weeks 
VICTORIN Renewed Motion For Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
VICTORIN Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
REMPFER Memorandum in support of revewed motion for John T. Mitchell 
summary judgment 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
05/14/2007 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Set 
W/CV02-7671 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
12/10/2007 09:00 AM) 1st Priority- 4 Days 
5/16/2007 Specta Site v Douglas lCawAtbl:Slitr,lai Notice oflliialt No. 43082 John T. Mitahel'36 
Date: 9/9/2015 
Time: 1 : 06 AM 



























Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, eta!. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Site vs. p Brenda J 
User 
HULL Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Enlargement 
HULL Affidavit of John P. Whelan 
HULL Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence 
HULL Motion for Enlargement 
LEPIRE Notice Of Hearing 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/13/2007 03:00 
PM) Enlargement of time; shorten time; 
disqualification for cause - Whelan 
VICTORIN Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence Filed 5-30-07 & Notice of Hearing 
VICTORIN Reply Memorandum un Support of Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
VICTORIN Affidavit of john Whelan 
VICTORIN Application for Order Shortening Time 
VICTORIN Motion To Disqualify for Cause 
User: DIXON 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
HULL Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of John Mack John T. Mitchell 
Filed 5/30/07 
MCCORD Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
MCCORD Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/13/2007 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Set W/CV02-7671 - Weeks - Strike Affd 
John Mack & Portion Affd Doug Lawrence 
CLAUSEN Order Shortening Time John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 06/13/2007 03:00 PM: Hearing Held set 
W/CV02-7671 - Weeks 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held Set W/CV02-7671 -
Weeks - Strike Affd John Mack & Portion Affd 
Doug Lawrence 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 06/13/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:00 PM: Hearing Held Enlargement of time; 
shorten time; disqualification for cause - Whelan 
CLAUSEN Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Disqualification for Cause 
NAYLOR New File Created 3 of 3 John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 08/07/2007 04:00 PM) Weeks - set 
w/CR02-7671 
CLAUSEN Motion for Reconsideration John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Motion for Permission to Appeal from an John T. Mitchell 
Interlocutory Order 
Spect<A1,i1e~ Douglas ~b'At;:sBNal olf)QJ:dJhfNe, ~Ian John T. 
Date: 
Time: 11 







































Fi dicial District Court Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
User: DIXON 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 



























vs. p Brenda Lawrence 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Reconsider 
08/06/2007 01 :30 PM) Whelan - CV02-7671 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2007 01 :30 
PM) Permission to Appeal - Whelan 
Notice Of Hearing 
AMENDED Notice Of Hearing 
Supplemental Affidavit of John P. Whelan 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Amended Supplemental Affidavit of John P. 
Whelan 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Summary Judgment 
Motion for Enlargement 
Motion to Strike 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff 
Request for Judicial Notice 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:00 
PM) Enlargement of Time; Strike; Request for 
Judicial Notice -Whelan 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
plaintiff's opposition to motion to reconsider John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike or in the Alternative for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement of time to File Responses 
New File Created ****4********** John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/07/2007 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Strike All Whelan's Motions - Weeks 
Motion to Shorten Time 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion to Reconsider held on John T. Mitchell 
08/06/2007 01:30 PM: Motion Denied Whelan -
CV02-7671 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/06/2007 John T. Mitchell 
01:30 PM: Motion Denied Permission to Appeal 
-Whelan 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider John T. Mitchell 
and Motion for Permissive Appeal 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 8 of 136 
Date: 5 
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Fir dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
User: DIXON 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 

























Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 08/07/2007 04:00 PM: Continued 
Weeks - set w/CR02-7671 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Motion Held Enlargement of Time; 
Strike; Request for Judicial Notice - Whelan 
Hearing result for Motion held on 08/07/2007 John T. Mitchell 
04:00 PM: Motion Held Strike All Whelan's 
Motions - Weeks 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 09/24/2007 03:00 PM) - Weeks- 1 
Hour 
Notice of Hearing 
plaintiffs Motion for protective order re. defs 
notice of deposition 
Objection to notice of depositition & demand for 
production of documents 
Amended Notice of Deposition and Demand for 
Production of Documents 
Subpoena Duces Tecum 
Notice of Deposition and Demand for Production 
of Documents 
plaintiffs Motion for protective order re. defs 2nd 
notice of deposition 
Notice Of Deposition, John Rook 
Motion for Enlargement 
Motion To Compel 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Supplemental Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in John T. Mitchell 
Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Enlargement and Motion to Compel 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for 
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Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al 
dicial District Court - Kootenai Coun 
ROA Report 
Judge: Steve 
eta!. vs. Douglas P etal. 
J Lawrence 
User: DIXON 
Order Granting Defendants' Request for Judicial John T. Mitchell 
Notice of the Court Files 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Strike 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery of Harold Funk 
Motion to Correct Judgment 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Stipulation to Plaintiff's Motion for Enlargement John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavit of Doug John T. Mitchell 
Lawrence Filed September 10, 2007 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defendants' John T. Mitchell 
Pleadings or in the Alternative for Enlargement of 
Time 
Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence Filed July 24, 2007 
Amended Motion to Correct Judgment John T. Mitchell 
Motion to Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
Notice Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 09/24/2007 03:00 PM: Continued 1 
Hour 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment 11/28/2007 03:00 PM) Weeks 
Notice of Hearing 
Order on Motion for Enlargement 
Order on Motion to Compel 
Order on Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
Second Amended Notice of Dposition and 
Demand for Production of Documents 
Notice Of Service Of Discovery 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Service John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Renewed Motion for DQ - Whelan - 1/2 hour 
Renewed Motion To Disqualify for Cause John T. Mitchell 
Affidavit of john Whelan in Support of motion for John T. Mitchell 
Disqualification 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from John T. Mitchell 
Hearing Dated 8/7 /07 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript from 
Hearing Dated 6/13/07 
John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
Additional Objections to Affidavit of Robert Hall John T. Mitchell 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From John T. Mitchell 
an lnterlos~!~~ '2~~~082 10 of 136 
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dicial District Court - Kootenai County User: DIXON 
ROA 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Verby 


























Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM) Mtn Court Trial - Weeks 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 
PM) Substitute Real Property Interest - Weeks 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Renewed motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Affidavit of John Whelan in Support of 
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Renewd Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff 
Affidavit of Raymond Goodwin in Support of 
Substitution of Real Party in Interest 
Motion To Continue Trial 
Notice of Change of Address 
Motion for Substitution of Real Party in Interest 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Hearing 
Notice Of Service Susan P Weeks by Fax 
11/12/07 
Notice Of Service forTower Asset Sub Inc on 
11-13-07 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/27/2007 03:30 
PM) Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal -
Whelan 
Response to Second Motion to Disqualify 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
Exhibit List 
Witness List 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 
03:30 PM: Motion Denied Renewed Motion for 
DQ - Whelan -1/2 hour 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Motion to Continue held on John T. Mitchell 
11/27/2007 03:30 PM: Motion Held Mtn Court 
Trial - Weeks 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Substitute Real 
Property Interest- Weeks 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
12/10/2007 09:00 AM: Continued 1st Priority- 4 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Days Docket No. 43082 11 of 136 
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icial District Court~ Kootenai County User: DIXON 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: 
























Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and John T. Mitchell 
Initial Pretrial Order 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment John T. Mitchell 
held on 11/28/2007 03:00 PM: Motion Held 
Weeks 
Hearing result for Motion held on 11/27/2007 John T. Mitchell 
03:30 PM: Motion Granted Renewed Motion for 
Permission to Appeal - Whelan 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 05/12/2008 09:00 John T. Mitchell 
AM) 5 Days - 1st Priorty 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order 
Expert Witness Disclosure 
New File Created****5*********** 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript of 
11/27/07 Hearing 
Return Of Service on Thomas Martinich (not 
found) 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Expert Witness Disclosure of Defendants John T. Mitchell 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled held on John T. Mitchell 
05/12/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 Days 
- 1st Priorty 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute 
Real Party in Interest 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/23/2008 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Presentment of Judgment 
Filing: T - Civil Appeals To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
($86.00 Directly to Supreme Court Plus this 
amount to the District Court) Paid by: John 
Whelan Receipt number: 0787294 Dated: 
3/19/2008 Amount: $15.00 (Check) For: [NONE] 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 787296 Dated John T. Mitchell 
3/19/2008 for 100.00) 
Notice of Appeal To The Supreme Court 
Clerk's Certificate to Supreme Court 
Hearing result for Motion held on 04/23/2008 
04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Presentment of 
Judgment 
Amended Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Notice of Transcript Lodged-Julie Foland 
Receipt Of Clerk's Record 07 /28/08 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 12 of 136 
Date: 9/9/2015 
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Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Verby 
Asset Sub etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Site p Brenda 
User 
ROBINSON Bond Converted (Transaction number 9499656 
dated 8/14/2008 amount 100.00) 
User: DIXON 
John T. Mitchell 
LSMITH Order Granting Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of John T. Mitchell 
Record 
ROBINSON Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any John T. Mitchell 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Lawrence Receipt number: 0831374 Dated: 
1/23/2009 Amount: $791.00 (Check) 
ROBINSON Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And John T. Mitchell 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Lawrence Receipt number: 0831374 Dated: 
1/23/2009 Amount: $.50 (Check) 
ROBINSON Receipt Of Transcript Appeal Pd For 1-23-2009 John T. Mitchell 
ROBINSON Appeal Receipt Payment John T. Mitchell 
MEYER Reviewed And Retained John T. Mitchell 
MEYER Reviewed And Retained John T. Mitchell 
MEYER Reviewed And Retained John T. Mitchell 
LEU Notice Of Appearance-Douglas Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
LEU Notice Of Appearance-Brenda Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
CRUMPACKER Amended Opinion John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/03/2010 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Entry of Judgment - Lawrence 
CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
CLEVELAND Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment 
CLEVELAND Defnedants Lawrences' Motion requesting the John T. Mitchell 
Court Enter a Final Judgment 
CLEVELAND Notice Of Hearing on defendants Motion For John T. Mitchell 
Entry of Final Judgment 
RICKARD Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/03/2010 John T. Mitchell 
02:30 PM: Continued Entry of Judgment -
Lawrence (continued by court) 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/04/201 O 02:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) For Entry of Judgment - Lawrence 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion held on 11/04/2010 John T. Mitchell 
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference John T. Mitchell 
12/15/2010 04:00 PM) 
CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al action Docket No. 43082 13 of 136 
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dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
User: DIXON 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, Spectra Site LLC vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User Judge 
11/5/2010 CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order Granting Plaintiff Partial Summary John T. Mitchell 
Judgment and Declaring Easement Rights 
11/10/2010 HUFFMAN Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to John T. Mitchell 
Supreme Court Paid by: Lawrence, Douglas P 
(defendant) Receipt number: 0048701 Dated: 
11/10/2010 Amount: $101.00 (Cash) For: 
Lawrence, Brenda J (defendant) and Lawrence, 
Douglas P (defendant) 
NOTC SREED Notice of Appeal - Douglas & Brenda Lawrence John T. Mitchell 
APSC SREED Appealed To The Supreme Court John T. Mitchell 
STAT SREED Case status changed: Reopened John T. Mitchell 
12/13/2010 ORDR RICKARD Order Augmenting Appeal John T. Mitchell 
12/15/2010 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Scheduling Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
12/15/2010 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
12/17/2010 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John T. Mitchell 
08/10/2011 03:30 PM) 
STAT CLAUSEN Case status changed: closed pending clerk John T. Mitchell 
action 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
FILE CRUMPACKER New File Created*** "116*** John T. Mitchell 
1/18/2011 BNDC RICKARD Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2220 Dated John T. Mitchell 
1/18/2011 for 17 4.50) 
2/15/2011 CERT CRUMPACKER Clerks Certificate Of Service John T. Mitchell 
3/18/2011 BNDV LEU Bond Converted (Transaction number 561 dated John T. Mitchell 
3/18/2011 amount 174.50) 
4/4/2011 CERT ROSEN BUSCH Clerk's Certificate Of Service John T. Mitchell 
5/17/2011 CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Status Conference held on John T. Mitchell 
08/10/2011 03:30 PM: Continued 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John T. Mitchell 
08/16/2011 03:00 PM) 
CLAUSEN AMENDED Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
6/27/2011 MISC LISONBEE Documents F8iled-Due Dates Suspended John T. Mitchell 
7/22/2011 ORDR SREED AMENDED Order Granting Motion to Correct John T. Mitchell 
Clerk's Record on Appeal 
7/27/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/16/2011 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Certify Judgment- Lawrence 
MOTN BAXLEY Defendants' Motion Requesting The Court To John T. Mitchell 
Certify The Partial Summary Judgment As 
Provided For By IRCP 54(b) 
8/16/2011 HRHD ROHRBACH Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
08/16/2011 03:00 PM: Hearing Held Certify 
Site Douglas Lawrence, Judgmentr:fobtt'tviti~nfto82 14 of 136 
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dicial District Court Kootenai County User: DIXON 
Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 




















Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 08/16/2011 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
District Court Hearing Held John T. Mitchell 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Certify the John T. Mitchell 
Partial Summary Judgment 
Hearing Scheduled {Motion 09/14/2011 04:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Permissive Appeal - Lawrence 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of John T. Mitchell 
Deffendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal 
from an Interlocutory Order 
Defendants' Motion for Permission to Appeal from John T. Mitchell 
an lnterlockutory Order 
Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
09/14/2011 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Permissive Appeal - Lawrence 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/14/2011 10:30 John T. Mitchell 
AM) Permissive Appeal - Lawrence 
AMENDED Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
District Court Hearing Held John T. Mitchell 
Court Reporter: Julie Foland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
09/14/2011 10:30 AM: Hearing Held Permissive 
Appeal - Lawrence 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference John T. Mitchell 
09/27/2011 09:00 AM) RE: Counterclaim 
Notice of Hearing 
Order Scheduling Status Conference 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 09/27/2011 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
John T. Mitchell 
Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Permission John T. Mitchell 
to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, and Order 
Scheduling Jury Trial on Defendants' 
Counterclaim 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
11/14/2011 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
John T. Mitchell 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al 
Notice of Delivery of Original Transcript 
Docket No. 43082 15 of 136 
Date: 5 dicial District Court ~ Kootenai County User: DIXON 
Time: 11 :06 AM ROA Report 
Page 13 CV-2003-0004621 Current Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etaL 
Tower Asset Sub Site p Brenda Lawrence 
Date Code User 
9/30/2011 ORDR CLAUSEN Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and John T. Mitchell 
Initial Pretrial Order 
10/24/2011 MNAM BAXLEY Defendants' Motion For Leave To Amend John T. Mitchell 
Counterclaim And To File A Supplemental 
Pleading 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Douglas Lawrence In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Defendants' Motion For Leave To Amend 
Counterclaim And To File A Supplemental 
Pleading 
10/31/2011 DFWL BAXLEY Defendants' Witness Disclosure List John T. Mitchell 
DEFX BAXLEY Defendants' Exhibit List John T. Mitchell 
11/1/2011 MOTN CRUMPACKER Motion for Enlargement of Time John T. Mitchell 
PLWL CRUMPACKER 1st supplemental Witness List John T. Mitchell 
PLTX CRUMPACKER 1st Supplemental List Of Exhibits John T. Mitchell 
11/2/2011 FILE BAXLEY ****************New File #7 Created**************** John T. Mitchell 
MOTN BAXLEY Defendant's Motion To Shorten Time John T. Mitchell 
MISC BAXLEY Defendant's Request For Continuance John T. Mitchell 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Douglas Lawrence In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Defendant's Request For Continuance 
MOTN BAXLEY Defendant's Motion For Sanctions Against John T. Mitchell 
Plaintiff For Failing And/Or Refusing To Answer 
Defendants' Discovery And For Failing To Comply 
With The Provisions Of The Scheduling Order, 
Notice Of Trial Setting And Initial Pretrial Order 
AFIS BAXLEY Affidavit Of Douglas Lawrence In Support Of John T. Mitchell 
Defendant's Motion For Sanctions Against 
Plaintiff For Failing And/Or Refusing To Answer 
Defendants' Discovery And For Failing To Comply 
With The Provisions Of The Scheduling Order, 
Notice Of Trial Setting And Initial Pretrial Order 
11/4/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue John T. Mitchell 
11/09/2011 04:30 PM) Lawrence 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/09/2011 04:30 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Shorten Time - Lawrence 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/29/2011 09:00 John T. Mitchell 
AM) Sanctions - Lawrence 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/29/2011 09:00 John T. Mitchell 
AM) Leave to Amend Counterclaim - Lawrence 
ORDR VIGIL Order Denying Motion for Permission to Appeal John T. Mitchell 
from an Interlocutory Order (Supreme Court 
Order) 
NOHG BAXLEY Notice Of Hearing on 11/09/11 at 4:30 pm John T. Mitchell 
11/7/2011 MISC CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Sanctions 
Spectf !iWt-oouglas &avMP,~ER 1st Amens@&§lil.ePJfs~ntal Witness List John T. Mit@6'1~36 
Date: 5 Fi dicial District Court ~ Kootenai County User: DIXON 
Time: 1 :06AM ROA 
Page 14 25 Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta!. 
Tower Sub Site LLC vs. p Lawrence 
Date Code User 
11/7/2011 PBRF CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Trial Brief John T. Mitchell 
MNLI CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Motion In Limine John T. Mitchell 
MISC CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion to John T. Mitchell 
Continue Trial 
AFFD CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Response to Motion John T. Mitchell 
for Sanctions 
MISC CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for John T. Mitchell 
Leave to Amend Counterclaim & to File a 
Supplemental Pleading 
MISC LEU Plaintiffs Proposed Jury Instructions John T. Mitchell 
11/9/2011 DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 11/09/2011 04:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
MOTION GRANTED 
DCHH CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/09/2011 04:30 PM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: JULIE FOLAND 
ORDR CLAUSEN Order for Mediation & Rescheduling Trial John T. Mitchell 
11/10/2011 HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/29/2011 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Leave 
to Amend Counterclaim - Lawrence 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
11/29/2011 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Sanctions - Lawrence 
CONT CLAUSEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 11/14/2011 09:00 AM: Continued 5 DAYS 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled John T. Mitchell 
05/07/2012 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
CLAUSEN Notice of Hearing John T. Mitchell 
11/21/2011 ORDR VIGIL Order (Supreme Court Order) John T. Mitchell 
11/29/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/05/2012 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) For Leave to Amend Counter Claim; 
Lawrence 
HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/05/2012 03:00 John T. Mitchell 
PM) Sanctions; Lawrence 
12/19/2011 REMT VIGIL Remittitur John T. Mitchell 
12/29/2011 HRSC CLAUSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/01/2012 09:00 John T. Mitchell 
AM) For Leave to Amend Counter Claim; 
Lawrence 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
01/05/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated For 
Leave to Amend Counter Claim; Lawrence 
HRVC CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
01/05/2012 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Sanctions;><LcaW~deD82 17 of 136 
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dicial District Court - Kootenai County User: DIXON 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Judge: Steve Yerby 










Defendants' Proposed Amended Counterclaim John T. Mitchell 
Notice Of Hearing (02/01/12 at 9:00 am) John T. Mitchel! 
Order of Self Disqualification, Order Vacating John T. Mitchell 
Hearing 
Disqualification Of Judge Mitchell - Self John T. Mitchell 
Order Assigning Judge On Voluntary John T. Mitchell 
Disqualification - John T. Mitchell 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled John T. Mitchell 
on 05/07/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 
DAYS 
CLAUSEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on John T. Mitchell 
02/01/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated For 
Leave to Amend Counter Claim; Lawrence 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/08/2012 04:00 Lansing L Haynes 
PM) Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaim, 
Motion to Certify PSJ, Pro se def. 
CRUMPACKER Defendants Renewed Motion Requesting the Lansing L. Haynes 
court to Certify the Partial Summary Judgment as 
Provided for by IRCP 54(b) 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes HODGE Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Leave to Amend Counterclaim and File a 
Supplemental Pleading 
HODGE Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Renewed 
Motion for Permission to Appeal from 
Interlocutory Order 
Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 





Court Reporter: VAL NUNEMACHER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion for Leave to Amend 
Counterclaim, Motion to Certify PSJ, Pro se def. 
Stipulation for Enlargement of Time to complete Lansing L. Haynes 
Mediation and Selection of Mediator 
Order Granting Stipulation for Enlargement of Lansing L. Haynes 
Time to complete Mediation and Selection of 
Mediator 
Mediation Case Statur Report Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
06/18/2012 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
SVERDSTEN AMENDED Notice of Trial Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Memorandum Decision and Order RE: 1. Defs' Lansing L. Haynes 
Renewed IRCP 54(b) Certification Motion; and 2. 
Motion for Leave to Amend the Counterclaim and 
File a Supplemental Pleading 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 18 of 136 
Date: 9/9/2015 
Time: 11:06AM 
































dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta!. 
User 
User: DIXON 
CLEVELAND Defendants' Proposed AMENDED Counterclaim Lansing L. Haynes 
in Accordance with the Court's May 1, 2012 
Memorandum decision and Order RE: 
1.Defendant's Renewed I.R.C.P.54(b) 
Certification 2.Motion for Leave to AMEND 
Counterclaim and File A Supplemental Pleading 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/05/2012 04:00 Lansing L Haynes 
PM) Motion for Sanctions, Doug Lawrence 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
06/05/2012 04:00 PM) 
SVERDSTEN 
ROHRBACH 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue 
05/31/2012 01 :30 PM) Weeks - and Mtn to 
Compel 
CRUMPACKER Motion To Continue Trial & Reset Pretrial 
Deadlines 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
DEGLMAN Answer to Amended Counterclaim- Spectra Site Lansing L. Haynes 
DEGLMAN Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Lansing L. Haynes 
Continue Trial and Reset Pretrial Deadlines 
CRUMPACKER Motion to Strike A Portion of Pleading Lansing L. Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Motion to Shorten Time Lansing L. Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/31/2012 01:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
PM) Motion to Strike, Motion to Shorten Time, 
Weeks. 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 05/31/2012 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Weeks - and Mtn to Compel 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 
05/31/2012 01:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
to Strike, Motion to Shorten Time, Weeks. 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Continue Lansing L. Haynes 
06/05/2012 04:00 PM) Motion to Continue Trial, 
Motion to Strike, Weeks 
CRUMPACKER Amended Notice Of Hearing Lansing L. Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 06/18/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 
DAYS 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion to Continue scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 06/05/2012 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Motion to Continue Trial, Motion to Strike, Weeks 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 19 of 136 
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i:· • I dicial District Court - Kootenai 
ROA 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: 
Asset Sub Inc, etaL vs. Douglas P 
p 
User: DIXON 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Pre·Trial Conference scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 06/05/2012 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: VAL NUNEMACHER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L Haynes 
06/05/2012 04:00 PM: Hearing Vacated Motion 
for Sanctions, Doug Lawrence 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Lansing L Haynes 
08/21/2012 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing Lansing L Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Injunction Lansing L. Haynes 
07/09/2012 03:30 PM) Def 
BAXLEY Defendants' Motion For A Preliminary Injunction Lansing L. Haynes 
Against Plaintiff 
SVERDSTEN Order (Re: June 5th hearing) Lansing L Haynes 
CRUMPACKER Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes HUFFMAN Amended Complaint Filed 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Preliminary Injunction Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 07/09/2012 03:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: AMY WILKINS 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Def 
MCCOY Order Re: Lawrences' Motion for a Preliminary Lansing L. Haynes 
Injunction - DENIED 
BAXLEY Defendants' Objection To Plaintiffs First Lansing L. Haynes 
Amended Complaint And Motion To Strike A 
Portion Of The Pleading 
ZOOK Defendants' Answer to First Amended Complaint, Lansing L. Haynes 
Defendants' Amended Counterclaim, and 
Defendants' Renewed Demand for Jury Trial 
LARSEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend Lansing L. Haynes 




Hearing result for Motion to Amend scheduled on Lansing L. Haynes 
08/21/2012 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
Weeks-amend complaint 
Notice Of Appearance-Douglas S Marfice Lansing L. Haynes 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Lansing L. Haynes 
on 08/21/2012 03:30 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: VAL NUNEMACHER 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 20 of 136 
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dicial District Court Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, eta!. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 





Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
04/15/2013 09:00 AM) 5 DAYS 
Notice of Trial 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 01/10/2013 03:30 PM) Weeks 
CRUMPACKER Expert Witness Supplemental Disclosure 
BAXLEY 
MCKEON 
Notice Of Service 
Subpoena Duces Tecum To Kootenai County 
Sheriff's Department, Records Department 
User: DIXON 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
MCKEON Amended Subpoena Duces Tecum To Kootenai Lansing L Haynes 





Department [Linda Mattos, Records Supervisor] 
*********** New File Created************ 
File#8 
Defendants' Answer to Amended Complaint, 
Defendants' Amended Couinterclaim, and 
Defendants' Renewed Demand for Jury Trial 
Stipulation for Issuance of AMENDED pre-trial 
Order 
Order - to adjust pretrial deadlines 
CRUMPACKER Notice of Compliance of Amended Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Kootenai County Sheriffs 
Department Records Department 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
LEU Stipulation For Second Amneded Answer And Lansing L. Haynes 
Counterclaim 
HUFFMAN Order Allowed - Defendants/ Counter-claimants Lansing L. Haynes 
To File Second Answer To Amended Complaint, 
Defendants' Amended Counterclaim And 
Defendants' Renewed Demand For Jury Trial 
DEGLMAN Answer to Defendants' First Amended Lansing L. Haynes 
Counterclaim 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Answers & Lansing L. Haynes 
Reqponses to Defendants First(sic)(Third)Set of 
Interrogatories & (s9c)(Third)Request for 
Production of Documetns & 
(Sic)(Second)Requests for Admission 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Lansing L. Haynes 
scheduled on 01/10/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing 
Vacated Weeks 
MCCOY Defendant's Second Answer to Amended Lansing L. Haynes 
Complaint, Defendants' Amended Counterclaim, 
and Defendants Renewed Demand for Jury Trial -
De Smet 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion 02/11/2013 10:30 Lansing L. Haynes 
AM) Motion to Consolidate, Marfice 
1/11/2013 Specta~hi9oouglas L§~~Ji!et al Notice Of~~l~S?!~k'Scovery Requests Lansing L. J1%¥~§tS 
Date: 9/9/2015 
Time: 1 :06 AM 






































dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta!. 
vs. Douglas P Brenda Lawrence 
User: DIXON 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiff Spectra Site LLC's Lansing L. Haynes 
2nd Request for Production of Documents to 
Defendants 
BAXLEY Notice Of Service Lansing L Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Lansing L Haynes 
02/11/2013 10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Valerie Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion to Consolidate, Marfice 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM) 
SVERDSTEN Notice of Hearing 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Answers & 
Responses to Defendants 3rd Set of 
Interrogatories & Requests for Production of 
Documents to Plaintiff 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service Of Discovery Responses 
SVERDSTEN Hearing Scheduled (Motion in Limine 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM) Weeks 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Hearing 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs 1st Motion In Umine 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Deposition (DL) 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Service 
CLEVELAND Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion in 
Limine 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L. Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
Lansing L Haynes 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Lansing L Haynes 
on 04/15/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 5 
DAYS 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Motion in Limine scheduled on Lansing L Haynes 
03/21/2013 03:30 PM: Hearing Vacated Weeks 
SVERDSTEN Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled Lansing L Haynes 








Plaintiffs Reply in Support of First Motion in 
Limine 
Administrative assignment of Judge Verby 
Order Assigning District Judge Verby 
Notice Of Transcript Delivery 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference 
05/16/2013 10:00 AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
06/11/2013 09:00 AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County - 8 days 
Lansing L Haynes 
John T. Mitchell 
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Notice of Pretrial Conference/Trial 
Docket No. 43082 22 of 136 
Date: 5 
Time: 11:06 AM 





























Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
User: DIXON 
CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 






















Amended Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/16/2013 10:00 
AM) Motion To Quash - Ed Holmes 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Subpoena Return/found - EH. - Witness and Steve Verby 
mileage fees demanded but not tendered at time 
of service EH. 5/14/13 
Affidavit of Edwin B. Holmes in Support of Motion Steve Verby 
to Quash 
Motion to Quash Subpoena Steve Verby 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing 




Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Steve Verby 
05/16/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages Motion To Quash -
Ed Holmes 
Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference scheduled Steve Verby 
on 05/16/2013 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages To Be Held In 
Kootenai County 
Plaintiffs Memorandum Of Law Regarding Steve Verby 
Determination Of Equitable And Legal Issues 
Withdrawal Of Motion To Quash Subpoena Steve Verby 
Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled Steve Verby 
on 06/11/2013 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated To 
Be Held In Kootenai County- 8 days 
Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled Steve Verby 
06/11/2013 09:00 AM) To Be Held In Kootenai 
County - 6/11-6/20 8 days 
Notice of Trial 
Acknowledgment Pursuant To Rule 16(k)(7) 
IRCP REgarding Case Status/Mediation 
Steve Verby 
Steve verby 
Second Notice Of Deposition (for Doug Lawrence Steve Verby 
on 05/24/13 at 9:00 am) 
AMENDED Second Notice Of Deposition (for 
Doug Lawrence on 05/30/13 at 9:00 am) 
Steve Verby 
SECOND AMENDED Consolidated Witness List Steve Verby 
(Plaintiff's) 
SECOND AMENDED Exhibit List (Plaintiffs) 
FILE CRUMPACKER New File Created********9********** 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
5/30/2013 Specttl!P{rDouglas ie-rfe'MPAt,(ER Amended1eeMff~'atti36+2Service(Witness List) Steve Verbf of 136 
Date: 5 
Time: 11:06 AM 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, eta!. 
VS. 
User 
CRUMPACKER Amended Certificate Of Service(Exhibit List) 
CRUMPACKER Third Amended Exhibit List 





CRUMPACKER Trial Witness List(Consolidated) Steve Verby 
LEU New File Created----CREA TED-----#10 Steve Verby 
BAXLEY Notice Of Deposition Of Jim Van Sky on 06/05/13 Steve Verby 



















Affidavit Of Service-J. C. -5/15/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J.K.-5/16/13 
Affidavit Of Service-KB.-5/16/13 
Affidavit Of Service-C.K.-5/16/13 
Affidavit Of Service-W.M.-5/17/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J.R.-5/18/13 
Affidavit Of Service-T.L.-5/18/13 
Affidavit Of Service-8. R.-5/18/13 
Affidavit Of Service-B. P. -5/ 19/ 13 
Affidavit Of Service-K. B.-5/19/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J.M.-5/20/13 
Affidavit Of Service-W.W.-5/21/13 
Affidavit Of Service-R.K.-5/31/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J.B.-5/14/13 
Affidavit Of Service-A.F.-5/15/13 
Affidavit Of Service-E.H.-5/14/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J. M. -5/ 14/ 13 
Affidavit Of Service-M.K.-6/1/13 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Issued RSH 
CRUMPACKER Subpoena Issued JR 
LEU Supplement Trial Withness List 
LEU Defendants' Trial Brief 
LEU Consolidated Prioposed Findings Of Fact And 





Consolidated Trail Brief 
Subpoena Issued BA 
Defendants' Proposed Findingins Of Fact And 




























Affidavit Of Service-B.A.-6/4/13 
Affidavit Of Service-J.R.-6/4/413 
Affidavit Of Service-R.H.-6/4/13 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby 
Steve Verby AFSV LEU 
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Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P 
vs. p 
User 
CRUMPACKER Defendant's Supplemental Trial Exhibits List 
CRUMPACKER Notice Of Transcript Delivery DPL 
CRUMPACKER Fourth Amended Exhibits List 
BAXLEY Fifth Amended Exhibit List (Plaintiff) 
BIELEC Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled 
scheduled on 06/11/2013 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Val Nunemacher 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: To Be Held In Kootenai County -









Plaintiffs' Supplemental Consolidated Trial Brief Steve Verby 





*************FILE 12 EXPANDO 
CREATED*********** 
PL EXHIBITS 
Memorandum Decision and Order 
Steve Verby 
CRUMPACKER Plaintiffs Motion to Correct Memorandum 












Memorandum Decision and Order [Substitute 
Decision the September 25, 2013, Decision is 
Withdrawn Due to a Scriverner's Error] 
Notice Of Compliance 
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 
05/22/2014 09:00 AM) Pre-trial Judgment & 
Status Conference 
Notice of Hearing 
Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled 
on 05/22/2014 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/26/2014 10:00 







Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, Steve Verby 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Spectra Site LLC, Plaintiff. Filing date: 5/27/2014 
Intermediate Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title, Steve Verby 
Permanent Injunction and Dismissal of a Portion 
of Defendant's Counterclaims 
Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Steve Verby 
action 
SpectiM$TIN)ouglas ~c:MANI Motion F 6tctl!.lel.te>.te3Wlthdraw Steve Ver~ of 136 
Date: 5 
Time: 11:06 AM 
























Fi icial District Court - Kootenai County 
ROA Report 
CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, eta!. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etaL 
vs. p Lawrence 
User 
DEGLMAN Affidavit of Douglas S Marfice in Support of 
Motion For Leave to Withdraw 
DEGLMAN Notice Of Hearing 
HOFFMAN Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial Scheduled 
11/05/2014 09:00 AM) 3 DAYS 
HOFFMAN Notice of Trial 
JLEIGH New File Created #11 
JLEIGH Motion For Reconsidertion 
JLEIGH Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Reconsidertion 
CLEVELAND ***File #12 Expando Created(Exhibits 1of 2)****** 
Pit's Exhibits 
CLEVELAND ***File #13 Expando Created(Exhibits 2 of 2)***** 
Pit's Exhibits 
LUCKEY Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
06/26/2014 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Byrl Cinnamon 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Under 100 Pages 
LEU Order Granting Leave To Withdraw At Attorney 















LEU Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Steve Verby 
Supreme Court Paid by: W. Jeremy Carr 
Receipt number: 0028033 Dated: 7/3/2014 
Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Lawrence, Brenda 
J (defendant) and Lawrence, Douglas P 
( defendant) 
LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28036 Dated Steve Verby 
7/3/2014 for 100.00) 
LEU Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 28038 Dated Steve Verby 
7/3/2014 for 1100.00) 
LEU Notice Of Substitution Of Counsel Steve Verby 
CLEVELAND Notice of Appeal Steve Verby 
CLEVELAND AMENDED Notice Appeal Steve Verby 
CLEVELAND Certificate Of Certified Mailing - 7012 3460 0000 Steve Verby 
3263 7130 - ISC 
MCCOY Return Certificate - 7/18/14 - ISC Steve Verby 
CLEVELAND Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal - ISC Steve Verby 
PEUKERT Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/04/2014 10:00 Steve Verby 
AM) DF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
PEUKERT Notice of Hearing Steve Verby 
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Fi icial District Court - Kootenai Count)' 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2003-0004621 Current Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, etal. vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Tower Asset Sub Inc, Spectra Site LLC vs. Douglas P Lawrence, Brenda J Lawrence 
Date Code User 
9/3/2014 MOTN JLEIGH Plaintiffs Motion For Enlargement Of Time To 
Respond To Defendants' MotionTo Reconsider 
And Motion To Shorten Time to Hear 
Enlargement 
MEMS JLEIGH Plaintiffs Memorandum In Support Of Motion For 
Enlargement OfTiem To Respond To 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider 
NOTH JLEIGH Notice Of Hearing On Plaintiffs Motion For 
Enlargement Of Time To Respond To 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider And Motion 
To Shorten Time To Hear Enlargement 
MEMO JLEIGH Plaintiffs Memorandum In Response To 
Defendants' Motion To Reconsider 
9/4/2014 DCHH MORGAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 
09/04/201410:00 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Keri Veare 
DF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
TELEPHONIC CALL (208) 743-9516 
9/19/2014 ORDR CLEVELAND Order Dismissing Appeal - Stephen W. Kenyon, 
Clerk ISC 
10/30/2014 ORJI DIGIOVANNI Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions 
DEFX DIGIOVANNI Defendant's Disclosure Of Witnesses and 
Exhibits 
BRIE DIGIOVANNI Plaintif s First Supplemental Trial Brief 
11/3/2014 REMT LEU Remittitur 
11/4/2014 MEMO LEU Memorandum Decision And Order Re: 1. Motion 
For Enlargement Of Time And 2. Motion For 
Reconsideration 
11/5/2014 JTST STECKMAN Hearing result for Jury Trial Scheduled scheduled 
on 11/05/2014 09:00 AM: Jury Trial Started 3 
DAYS 
11/6/2014 MISC DIXON Plaintiffs Second Supplemental Proposed Jury 
Instruction 
MISC STECKMAN PlaintiffsSecondSupplemental Proposed Jury 
Instruction 
MISC STECKMAN Jury Instructions Given 
11/10/2014 CVDI MCCOY Civil Disposition entered for: Lawrence, Brenda J, 
Defendant; Lawrence, Douglas P, Defendant; 
Spectra Site LLC, Plaintiff; Tower Asset Sub Inc, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 11/10/2014 
FJDE MCCOY Special Verdict 
STAT MCCOY Case status changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
1/14/2015 NIDE LUCKEY Notice Of Intent To Destroy Exhibits 
2/17/2015 FJDE LEU Final Judgment 























Steve Verb,7 of 136 
Date: 5 
Time: 1 :06 AM 




























Fi dicial District Court - Kootenai County User: DIXON 
ROA Report 
CV-2003-0004621 Judge: Steve Verby 
Tower Asset Sub etaL vs. Douglas P Lawrence, etal. 
Site Brenda J Lawrence 
User 
LUNNEN Affidavit Of Weeks In Support Of Memorandum Steve Verby 
Of Costs And Attorney Fees 
HUFFMAN Objection to Memorandum of Costs and Fees Steve Verby 
MITCHELL Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Steve Verby 
Supreme Court Paid by: Carr, William J. 
(attorney for Lawrence, Douglas P) Receipt 
number: 0012119 Dated: 3/27/2015 Amount: 
$129.00 (Check) For: Lawrence, Douglas P 
( defendant) 
DIXON Notice Of Appeal Steve Verby 
DIXON Certificate Of Mailing-4/2/15 Steve Verby 
****7014 2120 0003 7649 9131**** 
DEGLMAN Return Certificate- Supreme Court 4/6/15 Steve Verby 
BOOTH Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/19/2015 03:00 Steve Verby 
PM) for fees and costs 
HOFFMAN Notice of Hearing Steve Verby 
WOOSLEY Motion to Appear for Hearing by Telephone Steve Verby 
MCKEON Reply Memorandum In Support Of Costs And Steve Verby 
Attorney Fees 
STECKMAN Order to Appear for Hearing by Telephone Steve Verby 
STECKMAN Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Steve Verby 
05/19/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Keri Veare for fees and costs 
LEU Order Granting Costs And Attorney's Fees Steve Verby 
LEU Amended Final Judgment Steve Verby 
LEU Case status changed: Closed pending clerk Steve Verby 
action 
DIXON Notice of Transcript Lodged Steve Verby 
LEU Bond Converted (Transaction number 1166 dated Steve Verby 
6/10/2015 amount 1,100.00) 
DIXON Clerk's Certificate Of Service-7014 2120 00003 Steve Verby 
7649 8073 
Document sealed 
DIXON Bond Converted (Transaction number 1176 dated Steve Verby 
6/12/2015 amount 81.05) 
DIXON Cash Bond Exonerated (Amount 18.95) Steve Verby 
HUFFMAN Clerk's Certificate of Service - Susan P Weeks Steve Verby 
DIXON Certificate Of Mailing-6/16/15-SR-7014 2120 Steve Verby 
0003 7649 8073 
DIXON Clerk's Certificate Of Service Steve Verby 
MMILLER Return Certificate - 7/13/15 ******7014 2120 0003 Steve Verby 
7649 8080****** 
DIXON Stipulation To Augment Appellate Record Steve Verby 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS, !SB #4255 
JAMES, VERNON & 
1626 Lincoln Way 
d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667.:0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664~1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
OF LAW REGARDING 
DETERMINATION OF 
EQUITABLE AND LEGAL 
ISSUES 
Plaintiff Spectra Site Communications, L.L.C., by and through Susan P. Weeks of 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., its attorneys, submits the following Memorandum of Law 
Regarding Determination of EqJi~ble and Legal Issues. This case, for trial purposes only, was 
consolidated into Capstar Radi~.Operating Company v. Lawrence, Case No. 2002-DV-7671. 
· Both Capstar's and Spectra Site's predecessors commenced these cases in 2002 and 
2003, respectively, to quiet title to easements each claimed across Defendant's property along 
Blossom Mountain Road. Actions in quiet title invoke the court's equity jurisdiction. Dujfv. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of La~ Regarding Determination of Equitable and Legal Issues, page 1 
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.,Pu.norT 110 Idaho 865, 867, 719 P.2d 1 1 (1986) ( citing Howard v. Bar Bell Land & 
, 81 Idaho 1 959), and v. Whipple, 71 Idaho 
not a right to a quiet 
Duff, 110 Idaho at 867, 719 P.2d at 1127. "'Equity, having obtained jurisdiction of the subject 
matter of a dispute, will retain it for the settlement of all controversies between the parties.,,, Id. 
(quoting Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 602,606, 701 P.2d 222,226 (1985) 
(quoting Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,563,381 P.2d 802,809 (1963)). 
Idaho First National.Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., et al., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P.2d 841 
(1991), involved mortgage foreclosure, a proceeding in equity, and the Court relied on Carpenter 
v. Double R Cattle Co. in holding that with respect to an action in equity and its defenses neither 
party is entitled to a jury. Id., 121 Idaho at 274, 824 P.2d at 849. In addition, because the 
Court's equity jurisdiction is invoked by the Plaintiffs' quiet title actions, mthe court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of an 
appropriate judgment .... "'Id. (quoting Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 108 Idaho at 606, 
201 P.2d at 826 and I.R.C.P. 52(a))). 
This is true even if the court uses an advisory jury for the quiet title actions. Id. The 
Defendants may be entitled to a jury on their legal claims of trespass and breach of contract 
against Spectra Site, if a jury was timely requested, and the Court has the discretion to submit the 
equitable issues to an advisory jury. However, submitting the equitable issues to an advisory 
jwy would be inefficient and ill=advised. The Defendants' counterclaims largely depend on the 
Court's findings and conclusions regarding the equitable issues of quiet title to easements 
asserted by the Plaintiffs. If the Court finds and concludes that the Plaintiffs established rights to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law Regarding Determination of Equitable and Legal Issues, page 2 
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easements across Defendants' property, Defendants' counterclaim causes of action will likely 
Foods case 
"depend, to a greater or lesser degree, upon the determination of the rights and duties created by 
the original loan transaction and the trials court's findings of fact and conclusions oflaw on the 
equitable issues." 121 Idaho 266,290, 824 P.2d 841, 865. The Court continued: 
In making these findings of fact, the judge may defer to, but is not bound by, 
findings made on similar factual issues by the jury on any legal counterclaim. 
State ex rel: McAdams v. District Court, 105 N.M. 95, 728 P.2d 1364 (1986) 
("[W)hen legal and equitable issues are joined in a lawsuit the trial court should 
first decide the equitable issues, and then if any independent issues remain, those 
issues may be tried to ajuryupon appropriate request.'')[.] 
Id. The Court also quoted with approval the following: 
"(W]hen a case involves both legal and equitable issues the court roay in its 
discretion decide the equitable issues first. If the decision as to the equitable 
issues is such as is determinative of the legal issues a jury trial as to the latter is 
obviated. If not, the jury trial as to the remaining issues will follow." 
Id. (quoting Jaffe v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App.2d 592, 53 Cal.Rptr. 525, 36 (1966)) (emphasis 
added). 
It is simply more efficient and less cumbersome for the Court to render findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on the equitable claims and defenses of quiet title to easements without 
an advisory juxy, and to submit the legal claims of trespass and breach of contract to the jury if 
the Court finds that Spectra Site does not have an easement across Defendants' property. 
Courts and litigants are well-equipped to instruct juries on inconsistent and competing 
causes of action and to carefully craft special interrogatories to the jury. Nevertheless, there is 
still a substantial danger of misleading and confusing a jury and thereby prejudicing one or both 
parties if factual issues concerning the existence of easements and trespass are submitted to the 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law Regarding Determination of Equitable and Legal Issues, page 3 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 of 136 
The same facts that tend to establish an easement are the very facts that would support 
differences between opposing legal theories. 
Plaintiff Spectra Site accordingly requests that the Court exercise its discretion in 
detennining (1) not to submit equitable issues to the jury, and (2) submitting Defendants' legal 
counterclaims to the jury in the Spectra Site case only if the need for the jury as a finder of fact 
on those claims has not been obviated by the Court's findings and conclusions on the equitable 
quiet title issues. 
/·* ' DATED this J1r?.. day of May, 2013. 
JAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
~ 6>2ikPk 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorney for Plaintiff Spectra Site Communications, L.L.C. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law Regarding Determination of Equitable and Legal Iss9-es, page 4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / (i~ay of May, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
Douglas Marfice 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Fax: (208) 664-5884 
Theron J. DeSrnet 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
















Facsimile to: (208) 664.5884 
Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law Regarding Determination of Equitable and Legal Issues, page S 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, 
Box 1336 
L UvLJ.v. Idaho 1 
(208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Douglas S. Marfice, ISB #4072 
Theron J. De Smet, ISB #8184 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
E OF lDAHO 1 
COUNTY OF KOOTD4Arf SS 
FILED: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTARRADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 




DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE andBRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants, 
And JOHN DOES 1-6, Third Party Defendants. 
Case No. CV-02-7671 
Case No. CV-03-4621 




possibly represent most 
property more 
the Idaho courts, including multiple appeals, this dispute is ripe for adjudication on the 
merits. 
By virtue of the Idaho Supreme Court's most recent opinion in Capstar v. Lawrence, 
153 Idaho 411, 283 PJd 728 (2012) ("Capstar II") issues to be determined at trial of this 
matter are reduced down to the simple question of to whether the Plaintiffs can prove the 
requisite elements to establish an easement across the Lawrence Property under theories of 
implication, necessity, or prescriptive use. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On April 9, 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk acquired three parcels of land from 
Edward and Colleen Raden and Harold and Viola Marcoe. Parcel A (Government Lot 3), 
was located in the SW Y-i of the SW Y4 of Section 15; parcel B was the SE 1/4 of Section 21; 
parcel C consisted of the SW 1/4, and the NW 1/4 of Section 22, except for an approximately 
one acre lot which had been previously separated from the land and sold to General 
., 
Telephone Corporation, all located in Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho. A statutory warranty deed for the above described property was 
conveyed to the Funks on April 11, 1974. 
There were two roads to the Funk property; Mellick Road, a public road, entered the 
property in Government Lot 3, Section 15 from the north. A private road which leaves 
Signal Point Road (to the west) and entered the Funk Property in Section 21. This private 
road is the claimed easement at issue in this case. On July 1, 1975, the Funks entered into a 
of 136 
estate contract (as Human Synergistics, a Minnesota 
Property.) 
Between the time the Funks purchased their property in April 1969 and the time they 
sold a portion to Human Synergistics, Inc. in 1975, Funks' use of their property involved 
huckleberry hunting and target practice in the SW V,i of the SE Y-i in Section 21 (the land that 
lies directly west of the Lawrence Property). During the six year period between 1969 and 
197 5, the Funks only made about 20-3 0 trips to the property. 
The private road, known as Blossom Mountain Road or W. Appleblossom Road, 
begins at Signal Point Road in the SW Y4 of Section 21, travels in a south-easterly direction 
into the NE V4 of Section 28, before turning and traveling in a north-easterly direction and 
entering the Funks' property in the SE Y4 of Section 21. The road extends east across the SE 
V4. of Section 21 where it enters the SW V,i of Section 22. After entering Section 22, Blossom 
Mountain road divides with the main path continuing in a north-easterly direction where it 
eventually turns into Mellick Road. A spur extends in a westerly direction where it ends near 
• • 
the Capstar Parcel in Section 22. 
Blossom Mountain Road crosses two privately owned parcels of land that were never 
owned by the Funks or the Funks' predecessors in interest. Blossom Mountain Road has 
been gated in the SW \/,i of Section 21 since as early as 1966 and requiring the use of a key for 
access. According to Funk, GTC gave him a key to the gate. 
In November 1972, Wilber and Florence Mead granted the Funks an easement to use 
the road as it crosses the SW V4 Section 21. Wilber Mead did not own any land in the NE 11,i. 
of 136 
however, did not, nor could not, grant the Funks an easement to use the 
crosses was aware own 
never owners 28 an 
easement. Funk generally didn't cross through Section 28, instead he would cut over (prior 
to entering Section 28) on a spur that led to the top of the mountain. There is no evidence that 
Funk had any ingress/egress rights on Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the NE 11,i of 
Section 28. In the fall of 1975, Funk moved to the Aberdeen area. After 1975, Funk only 
visited the property 2-3 more times in total and never visits his remaining property after 19 81. 
In September 1989, Funk sold five acres of land in the SW 11,i of Section 22 to 
Kootenai Broadcasting Company owned by John Rook. Rook first traveled to the land only 
after the purchase from Funk had closed. Blossom Mountain Road was gated at that time and 
required the use of a key for access. Rook received permission to use the road and a key 
from Wilber Mead to get through the gate. Rook only visited the property three or four times 
a year, but had agents/employees who went to it more frequently. Rook believed that there 
was an agreement that gave him the right to use Blossom Mountain Road and that his use of 
the road was permissive. Rook never knew which properties the road crossed, where those 
" 
properties were in relation to the Sections, and never knew who owned those properties. 
Rook transferred his interest in the land in Section 22 to AGM in November 1998, and in 
October 2000 AGM transferred the property to Capstar. 
In July 1996, the Lawrences purchased 80 acres on Blossom Mountain. Part of the 
Lawrence Property (the E Yi of the SE Y4 of the SE 1/4 of Section 21) had previously been 
owned by Funk. The disputed easement crosses this part. The Lawrences were approached 
in 1997 by Nextel which requested permission to cross the Lawrence Property on Blossom 
No.43082 136 
" 
~-... -,.u Road. Nextel was a tenant a one acre parcel leased from Robert and Mark Hall 
a 
access on 
the Lawrences entered into an (irrevocable) Access License Agreement with Nextel. That 
Access License Agreement required Nextel to pay a monthly license fee to the Lawrences in 
exchange for allowing Nextel's agents to cross the Lawrence Property. Nextel was provided 
a key to the gate. 
In October 2001, the Lawrences entered into an Access License Agreement with 
Great Northern Broadcasting, a tenant of Capstar. They provided Great Northern 
Broadcasting with a key to the gate. Great Northern Broadcasting never terminated the 
Access License Agreement. Rather, it simply quit making monthly license fee/payments just 
prior to Capstar filing suit. Likewise, Nextel's successor (Spectrasite) never terminated its 
Access License Agreement, and it too simply quit making payments and sued the Lawrences. 
PROCEDURAL ffiSTORY 
In November 2002, Capstar filed suit for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to 
have an easement declared on alternative theories of express easement; easement by 
• • 
implication; easement by necessity and prescriptive easement. Capstar prevailed and 
Lawrences appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the District Court's summary 
judgment and expressly found that no express easement over the Lawrence Property exists. 
See, Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 704, 708, 152 P.3d 575, 579 
(2007). On remand, Capstar renewed its motion for summary judgment on the theories of 
easement by implication, easement by necessity and prescriptive easement. Again, Capstar 
prevailed and again the Lawrences appealed. Again, the Supreme Court reversed and 
38 136 
a period of procedural wrangling over whether the District Court's 
on most recent 
intended) to this trial court. 
The Supreme Court reviewed each easement theory in tum. 
With respect to easement by implication, the Supreme Court found that the record 
presented genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Funks' use of Blossom 
Mountain Road was apparent and continuous and whether it was reasonably necessary for 
the Funks to use that road to reach their property in Section 22. The law of that case 
establishes that Mellick Road, which was made public in 1910, extended into the land owned 
by the Funks in Section 15. Though Capstar argues that Mellick Road did not extend all the 
way into the Funks Property in Section 22; that argument is irrelevant. Because the Funks' 
property in Section 15 is contiguous with and adjacent to Section 22, if Mellick Road 
extended into Section 15, that road, per force, provided access to all of the Funks property. It 
is not necessary that the road extend all the way through Section 15 and into 22. 
Additionally, there was at the time of Funks' ownership of the property an old logging 
• • 
road which actually extended into their land in Section 22, but which was allowed to grow 
over and was in poor condition. Funks didn't use it, but they could have. The Idaho 
Supreme Court noted that the presence of this road would defeat any claim of reasonable 
necessity for using Blossom Mountain Road because the property owner cannot create 
necessity by their own actions or neglect. 
1 153 Idaho 411,283 P.3d 728 (2012) 
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The Supreme the access road for 
not to 
use. 
"regular use" which is open and continuous enough to "insure that the buyer of the survient 
property will have notice of the preexisting use," the Supreme Court has virtually 
preordained this trial court's inevitable conclusion that no easement by implication can arise 
from Funks' use of Blossom Mountain Road. 
For many of the same reasons, use by Plaintiffs' other predecessors in interest 
(Kootenai Broadcasting/Rook Broadcasting) is also insufficient to establish an easement by 
implication. 
The absence of an essential element of an easement claim is fatal to the claim. The 
absence of evidence of apparent continuous use and reasonable necessity for that use are fatal 
to any claim of an implied easement on Blossom Mountain Road. 
For this reason, Plaintiffs' claims of easement by necessity simply fail as a matter of 
law. As the Supreme Court noted in Capstar II, there must exist at the time of severance a 
necessity for an easement, and there must be great present necessity for the easement. The 
• 
evidence in this case establishes neither. At the time of the severance of the property by 
Funk, Funk had access to all of his property via Mellick Road which was a public road since 
approximately 1910. Thus, no existing necessity at the severance. Even though Mellick 
Road may not have gone and through all portions of Funks parcel, the Capstar II Court has 
declared "the requirements of necessity do not require that there be access to all portions of a 
parcel or that there be the most convenient access possible." Additionally, the Supreme 
No,43082 
observed that even Blossom Mountain Road was the preferred or convenient 
to 
no over 
necessity is claimed has no access to a public road, no necessity can arise" ( citing, Rathbun v. 
Robson, 661 P.2d 850 (1983)). 
Last, Plaintiffs' easement by prescription theory also fails. 
In prior proceedings, Plaintiffs focused on arguing that an easement by prescription 
exits because Funk utilized Blossom Mountain Road to access the remainder of his property 
after conveying a portion of it to Lawrences' predecessor, Human Synergistics in 1975. The 
Capstar II opinion corrected the District Court's clear error in examining Funks' use of 
Blossom Mountain Road from 1969 to 1975 and correctly noted that the appropriate period 
for this analysis was whether Funk used Blossom Mountain Road openly, notoriously, 
continuously and adversely after Funk conveyed title to Human Synergistics. The correct 
time period for a prescriptive use by Funk can only be measured beginning in 1975. But 
noted the Supreme Court: "Funks limited use of the road from 1975 to 1981 does not 
constitute open and continuous use." The Supreme Court also found, and it is the law of 
• • 
the case, that after 1981 Funks use of the road over the Lawrence parcel was interrupted and 
unused until the time Funk sold the Capstar parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting in 1989. 
Accordingly, for any easement by prescriptive use to arise, the trial court's focus must 
turn to the uses that began in 1989 when Plaintiffs predecessor Kootenai Broadcasting 
acquired what is now the Capstar property. The evidence at trial will be that Kootenai 
Broadcasting and its successor Rook Broadcasting, only used the Blossom Mountain Road 
136 
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and through 
Weeks 
attorneys, submits the following Supplemental Consolidated Trial Brief. 
I. SUBJECTIVE BELIEF OF PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CLAIMANT IS 
IRRELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING WHETHER USE 
WAS ADVERSE AND HOSTILE 
A prescriptive easement claim.ant must establish.by reasonably clear and con:vi.ncing 
evidence, use for at least five years that is open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, 
adverse and under a claim of right, with the actual or imputed knowledge of the landowner. Use 
that is permissive is not in derogation. of the servient estate ov.ner's rights. Th.e term "under a. 
claim of right" r.neans that "the claimant has used the way without recognition ofth.e rights of the 
owner of the servienttenement" Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225., 231 76 P.3d 969,975 (2003) 
(quoting Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 680, 936 P.2d 975, 980 (1997)). The Hodgins Court 
elucidated: 
The nature of the use is characterized as hostile in that it runs contrary to the 
servient owner's claims to the prope.rty. [Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho at 680, 
936 P .2d at 980]. However, the state of mind of the claimant is not controlling; 
the focus is u:pon the nature of the claimant's use. Cardenas v. Kurrduweit, l 16 
Idaho 739, 740~ 779 P.2d414, 415 (1989). 
Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho at 231 76 P.3d at 975-76 (2003). 
In Cardenas v. Kurpjuweit, J.16 Idaho 739, 779 P.2d 414 (1989), the Court specifically 
overruled French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950, 751 P .2d 98 (1988), Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 
111, 697 P.2d 451 (Ct. App. 1985), and Cusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229, 215 P.2d 297 (1950), to 
the c:xtent those cases stood for the "erroneous proposition" that the prescriptive easement 
claimant's state of mind is relevant to determining whether the pre$cri.pti.ve easement has been 
established. Cardenas, 11.6 Idaho at 417, 779 P.2d at 742. Th.e Cardenas Court quoted at length 
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sam.e and in that the 
This state of mind doctrine is illogical. The 'adversity' of a claimant's use lies in 
its derogation from the exclusive rights of the landowner; it does not lie in the 
claimant's state of mind. Regardless of the m.otive with which a prospective 
claimant crosses a landowner's property, his use derogates from the landowner's 
rights unless the crossing is by permission, express or legally presumed. 
Mo:reover, the state of mind doctrine creates a perverse incentive to offer 
contrived but virtually unrebuttabl.e testimony. A sophisticated claimant, aware of 
the Hall and French decisions, would never admit having thought a road was 
public; he would simply testify that he used the road because he found it 
convenient 
Accordingly~ I agree w,ith today's opinion that the adversity of a clahnant's use 
is deter.mined not by his subjective belief but by the nature of the use itself. As the 
Washington Supreme Court has noted: 
[TJhere is little persuasive precedent for applying a subjective 
standard of adverse use in prescriptive easement cases. The 
gravamen of adversity in such cases is whether the user has 
occupied the property in a man.u.er -w:hich is adverse to the true 
o'WJ1er. 
Dunbar v. Heinrich, 95 Wash. 2d 20,622 P.2d 812, 815-16 (1980) (citations and 
footnote omitted). 
114 Idaho at 83-85, 753 P.2d 194-96 (Burnett, J. specially concurring) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis by underscoring added, italics in original). 
Cardenas, 116 Idaho a.t 417, 779 P.2d at 742. 
In Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390,210 P.3d 75 (2009), the Court stated that the 
nature of the use of a claimed prescriptive easement is adverse if mit I'Wls contrary to the servient 
C01utr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196,206 (2005) (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 
Idaho 225,231, 76 P.3d 969,975 (2003))). The easements users' state ofmind is not 
co1:1trol.Hng, but the focus is on the nature of their use. "Moreover, 'mere in.action and passive 
acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for pr.oving th.at the use of the claimed right was w:itb the 
. PLAINTJ.FFS' SUPPLEMENTAL CONSOLIDATED TRIAL BRIEF, page 3 
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owner tenement. at at 
Smith, Idaho 511 1326. 
Thus, what the Plaintiffs and their predecessors. tenants and service personnel believed 
about their use of the disputed access road is irrelevant This Court must instead look at the 
nature of the use of the Plaintiffs, their predecessors, tenants and service personnel. TI1e 
testimonial, deposition. and documentary evidence supports findings that Plaintiffs' use of the 
parcel now owned by Defendants was in derogation from the exclusive rights of the owners of 
the Defendants' property. The evidence is that Plaintiffs acted under a claim of right-not 
because they believed they were authorized to use the road, or believed they were trespassing, or 
believed anything. Rather, the adverse use under a claim of right is established because they 
used the access road without regard to any pr1vate property rights. They traveled over the road to 
get to the tower sites because it was necessary. Their property at the top of the mountain needed 
service, repair or installation, and whether the gates were open or closed, unJocked, or in. many 
cases locked, an.d wh.ether they saw no trespassing signs or not and whether or not no trespassing 
signs existed, Plaintiffs and their agents used the road without regard for whether the road was 
private, public or burdened by an easement. Such use is by its nature adverse and hostile to the 
exclusive rights of the Defendants to their property. 
II. AUTHORIZATION BY A NON-SERVIENT ESTATE OWNER DOES NOT 
-------eONSTIT-tJT-E-PERMISSION-TO-USE-S·ERVIENf-E-STA-TE'----------
The Court heard substantial testimony concerning two closed, and at various times, 
locked gates on Blossom Mountain. Road before the gate on Defendants' property. Exhibit 73 
depicts the yellow, swina arm gate on Signal Point Road, and Exhibit 71 depicts Wilbur Mead's 
gate. Toe testimonial evidence is that Mead's gate (Exhibit 71) was locked (at least some of the 
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Signal Point 
1s Notice from Post Falls Highway District concerning the placement the Signal Point 
Road gate. Although Idaho Forest Industries was charged with building) installing and 
maintaining the gate, Mike Kahoutek, Wilbur. Mead's nephew and a JJearby property owner, took 
over administering locks on the gate about five years ago because he lived close by. His 
tesHmony was not that he granted permission to any person to use Blossom Mountain Road. His 
understanding was that he was required to give keys to landowners or businesses wi.th property 
beyond the gate: 
Q. Okay. And was it your understanding you were 
required to give keys to any land own.er who had property 
behind that gate? 
A. Yes, any land ow:ner or business. 
Q. Okay. So your understandin.g of your duties 
and responsibilities was to provide keys to.land owners 
or to businesses that had a right to go beyond that 
gate? 
A. Correct. 
Rough Transcript, Trial Day 2, p. 138. 
In addition, Wilbur granted an easement appurtenant to Funk, both .Parties' predecessor in 
interest, to traverse Blossom Mountain Road as it crossed the Mead property in Section 21, west 
of-Befendant1s-property:-Exhibit-4·:-A:cco:rding1y,MeatP.s-maintainin:g-a-gate-on1:he-road-does 
not ar.n.oun.t to permission to use the road on hlr, property, much less on Defendants' property. 
In Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 682, 936 P.2d 975) 982 (1997), the Court held that 
the servicnt estate ow1.1er could maintain a gate on his premises "to limit use of the lane to those 
with a right to use the roadway, provided the gate does not obstruct any easement holder's use," 
PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEJviENT AL CONSOLIDATED TRTAL BRIEF, page 5 
Specta ~lte v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 45082 4'1' of 136 
Specta Douglas Lawrence, Docket 43082 48 36 
stated: 
case estate 
Further, the Court Hughes v. 1 ldaho 474, 1 1223 (Idaho 2006), 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the sentient tenement was by 
permission of its owner, because the use, by defin.iti.on, was not adverse to the 
rights of the own.er. Marshall [v. Blair], 130 Idaho [675] at 680,946 P.2d [975] 
at 980 [(1997)). Indeed, the rule is well established that no use can be considered 
adverse or ripen into a prescriptive right unless it co:nstitutes an. actual invasion 
of or infringement on the rights of the ovm.er. Simmons {v. Perkins]. 63 Idaho 
[136] at 144, 118 P.2d [740] at 744 [(1941)]. 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho at 480, J.29 P.3d at 1229 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiffs have found no case law establishing or suggesting that if a nearby property 
owner who has an obligation to allow access across bis property provides keys to such a gate that 
it constitutes permission to travel lands uot o'WI'led by hi.m. pennits or authorizes the dominant 
estate owner access through a gate across the road on property that is near the servient estate, the 
dominant estate owner is then unable to show use of the road adverse to the servient estate 
own.er. 
m. DOES A LANDOWNER HA VE A DUTY TO DEVELOP A PUBLIC ROAD 
ONCE IT'S NO LONGER BEING USED? 
No Idaho Supreme Court case or Idaho Court of Appeals case has addressed this issue. 
Further, in. the present case, there is evidence that neither Kootenai County nor. the Post Falls 
Highway District, or its predecessor highway district, developed a roadway along the alignment 
of Mellick Road as laid out in the Viewer's Report. There is evidence that a portion. of Mellick 
Road was developed from its initial poin.t at Walker Road (now known as SchilHn.g Loop) to 
approximately the east branch of Mellick Road, leading to Charles' Steele's cabin. There is also 
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evidence from a 1959 Metsker map that a road which followed Mellick Road to its east bran.ch. 
existed, but thereafter it varied significantly from the alignment of Mellick Road as laid out in 
1907. 
In a case involving a viewer's report road laid out but not constructed, Klosterman v. 
Stqfford, 134 Idaho 205,208, 998 P.2d l 118, l 122 (2000), our Supreme Court held the following 
regardin.J construction of a Jaid out road: 
There is no evidence th.e county ever developed. a roadway along the 
section line. Although the county may develop a public highway in. the futw-e, 
consistent with the reservation made in 1904, no public roadway developed or 
approved by the county exists at this time. There is no basis to con.elude that any 
dedication of a right to develop a public road in 1904 created the type of right-of. 
way claimed by Klosterman in this action. 
Until abandonment is authorized by the commissioners, public use of the highway or 
public right-of-way may not be restricted or impeded by encroachment or installation of 
any obstructio.n restr.icting public use. I.C. § 42-203, Trunnell v. Ferge/, 153 Idaho 68, 
278 P.3d 938 (2012). However, no statute or case law places the burden of developing a 
public right of way upon potential users of such right of way. Idaho Code 40-117(9) 
gives tbe publi.c a right to use the wideveloped right of way. If the right of way is 
developed by the highway district, it is required to follow the state bid laws for 
procurement of public construction in developh1g the right of way. T.C. § 40-901. 
IV. IN AN IMPLIED EASEMENT CASE, THE COURT MAY CONSIDER 
OTHER EVIDENCE OF INTENT BESIDES USE OF THE EASEMENT 
~~~~~~~~~~~~PIUOR-:TO~EPARAilON-OF-'JI-t!LE~.~~~~~~~~-
Neither (Capstar v. Lawrence1 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012) ("Capstar 
III") nor (Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 212, 219, 280 P.3d 71.5, 722 (2012) stand for the 
proposition that a private landowner ba.t1 to construct a public road to acquire access to 
their property. Lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy or 
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successful cultivation by alack of access. Burley Brick & Sand Co. v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 
333,335,629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981) quoting from J.7A AM.JUR. Easements§ 58~ p. 
668. See also Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 501 P.2d 1383 (1972). 
Where the owner of an estate consisting of several pru.1s so adapts them. during his 
ownership that one derives benefit from the other, and thereafter transfers one of the parts 
with all appurten.an.ces without mention of the incidental burdens of one in respect to the 
other, an implied easement is created. Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,270,215 P.2d 
812~ 814 (1950). 
Because an implied easement from prior use arises at the time of severance, the 
issue of reasonable necessity is based upon the circumstances that existed at that tin1e. 
Akers l, 142 Idaho 293,302, 127 P.3d 196,205 (citing Davi,f v. Peacock, 133 ldaho at 
642,991 P.2dat367). 
In Bird 11. Bidwell, 209 P.3d 647,649, 147 Idaho 350,352 (2009), our Supreme 
· Court held with respect to the second element that: 
The second element includes as a necessary consideration the intent of the grantor 
at the time the domin.ant estate was separated. The intent to grant or reserve the 
easement is presumed from apparent continuous use for. a long period of time 
prior to that separation. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948~ 951 
(1976). The easement is "based on th.e theory that when someon.e con.veys 
property, they also intend to con.vey whatever is required for the beneficial use 
and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that is requited for the use 
and enjoyment oftb.e land retained." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,643,991 
P.2d 362, 368 (1999). Because the intent to grant or reserve the easement is a 
PAGI::. !:H:l/ ll 
--~---~neeessary-elem.ent;-there-is-ne-logieal-reasen-ta-hase-the-deei&i.en-selely-upan-th.Pc--------
grantor's presumed inte11t from p:rior use and to exclude other relevant evidence of 
that intent. Therefore, the district court did not err i.n considering th.at other 
evidence. 
In Donaldson v. Thou8a1td Springs Power Co., 29 Idaho 735, 747, 162 P. 334, 
388 (1916), our Supreme Court held that where real estate is agreed to be conveyed by au. 
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equitable at once to the 
540; 681 P .2d 1010, l O 15 {Ct.App.1984), the Court of Appeals recognized that the sale 
agreement could address access to a parcel, and could impose access as a requirement jn 
the sale agreement. In the present case, Funk entered into a Sale Agreement with Human 
Syn,;lrgistics, Inc. This sale agreement included a reservation of ai, easement across the 
Lav.rrence parcel. The reservation of this easement demonstrates an. intent that such use 
was meant to continue. The fact that it was omitted in the 1992 deed does not negate this 
intent, even. though the doctrine of merger eliminated this contract clause. 
V. IN THE PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT CLAIM, THE ORIGIN OF THE USE 
OF THE ROAD BY FUNK IS KNOWN, THEREBY ELIMlNATING THE 
NECESSITY OF RESORTING TO PRESUMPTIONS 
In the seminal case of Westv. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d 1326, 1333 
(Ct. App. 1986), cited with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court1, our Court 
of Appeals held: 
[PJroof of open, notorious, continuous, uniJlterrupted use of the claimed right for 
the prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, 1·ai.ses the 
pres'UID:ption that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. The burden. is 
then on the owner of the servient tenement to show that the use was pennissive, or 
by virtue of a license, co:n:tract, or agreemeu.t. (Emphasis added.) .. 
One exception to this rule occurs when the servie.nt land is wild, unenclosed, or 
unimproved. Tlien ffie presumption is that the use was permissive. We.~t, 95 Idaho at 557 
n. 32, 51. J. P.2d at 1333 n. 32. Mere inaction. and passive acqui.escence is not a sufficient 
1:>asis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the pennissfon oftbe owner 
ofthe servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Jdaho 550,557,511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). 
1 See Brown v, Miller, 140 Tdaho 439, 95 P.3d S7 {2004). 
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use 
1 Idaho 
The origin of the use of the road by Funk to access the SW~ of Section 1s 
known .. Further, it is known that Funk retained this right when he entered into the Sales 
Agr·eement with Human Synergistics. This right was lost through the doctrine of merger 
when Fmuc was presented with a deed different than the fulfillment deed. he deposited 
with Washh1gton Trust Bank By then, Fu.r1k had suffered a major illness (cancer) which 
he testified significantly impacted bis ability to transact business. Thus, there is no need 
to r1~sort to presumptions. Funk used the road because he retained that right in his Sales 
Agreement with Human Synergistics and did not lose that contractual right un.ti.l issuance 
of the warranty deed in 1992, at which time it was lost by operation of law pursuant to 
the doctrine of merger. 
ti 
DATED th.i.s ! 7 day of June, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P .A 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorney for Plaintiff Spectra Site L.L.C. 
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ST ATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, INC., 
Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 















CASE NO. CV-03-4621 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
After a six-day bench trial, the determination is made that Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 
proved its claims for an implied easement and an easement by necessity. No prescriptive easement 
determination is necessary as plaintiff is awarded an easement by implication and necessity. A 
permanent injunction is granted in favor of the plaintiff precluding the Lawrences from interfering 
with the easement. Plaintiff is found to be the prevailing party and is awarded costs. 
Susan Weeks, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., represented Spectra Site Communications, 
Inc. 
Douglas Marfice and Theron DeSmet, RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP, represented Doug and 
Brenda Lawrence. 
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causes 
action. Tower alleged the existence an express easement, or in the alternative, easements 
by implication, necessity, and prescription. Additionally, Tower alleged causes of action for 
injunctive relief and breach of contract. 
On August 17, 2004, Tower filed its first motion for summary judgment only with respect 
to the express easement claim. 
On May 27, 2005, Judge Mitchell entered an "Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title," wherein the court entered summary judgment for 
Tower on the express easement cause of action. The Lawrences appealed. On January 26, 2007, 
the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision, Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 
152 P.3d 581 (2007) (Tower I), reversing the order granting summary judgment and remanded 
the case. 
On May 14, 2007, Tower filed a renewed motion for summary judgment arguing that 
Tower had easements by implication, necessity and prescription. On September 10, 2007, the 
LavvTences filed their Motion to Amend Answer. 
On November 13, 2007, Tower filed a motion to substitute the real party in interest, 
Spectra Site, LLC. On November 27, 2007, the court entered a pre-trial order and reset the trial 
to commence on May 12, 2008. 
On February 6, 2008, a "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion to Substitute Real Party in 
1 Tower Asset Sub Inc. assigned its interests in the subject communication tower to Spectra Site, LLC, which in turn 
assigned its rights to Spectra Site Communications, rnc. 
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statute of limitations were not viable. The previous court also substituted Spectra Site, LLC as 
the real party in interest. 2 
On March 19, 2008, the Lawrences appealed the memorandum decision and order. On 
August 25, 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision, Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 149 Idaho 621, 238 P.3d 221 (2010) (Tower II), dismissing the appeal because no 
final judgment had been entered in the case. 
On remand, the matter was assigned to District Judge Lansing Haynes. Acting in his role 
as administrative judge, he assigned the case to Judge Steve Yerby. On June 11, 2013, a six-day 
bench trial began. It concluded on June 18, 2013. The trial was combined with Capstar Radio 
Operating Company v. Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02-7671, 
as there were common issues, common witnesses, and the same defendants in each action. The 
issues tried were equitable and therefore could only be determined by the court. Other non-
equitable issues for which a jury trial was demanded were bifurcated. 
This court has carefully reviewed and considered the pleadings, evidence, and briefing, 
and now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order, which shall constitute findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to LR.C.P. 52(a). Any of the following findings of fact that should 
be denominated as a conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the 
following conclusions of law that should be denominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a 
finding of fact. 
2 On July 5, 2012, Spectra Site, LLC filed its First Amended Complaint, with leave of the court, naming Spectra Site 
Communications, Inc. as the plaintiff and real party in interest. 
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II. 
plaintiff, Spectra is a lessee of Halls, who own real property on Blossom 
Mountain. The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 and the Hall 
parcel is located to the east of the Lawrence parcel in the southwest quarter of Section 22. 
Section 21 is directly west of Section 22. Both the Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were part 
of a larger tract of land that was once owned by Harold and Marlene Funk (the "Funks"). The 
Funks purchased their real property in 1969, which consisted of land in Section 15, Section 21, 
and Section 22. All the lands involved in this case are located in Township 50 North, Range 5 
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
2. Access and Chain of Title 
There was no testimony contesting the following facts, which were established by the 
admission of exhibits and/or the testimony of the witnesses. For ease of understanding, these 
facts are placed in chronological order. 
The only public road providing access to the private easement road, which then accesses 
all of the real property which is subject to this litigation, is Signal Point Road. This easement 
road that connects to Signal Point Road has been referred to as Blossom Mountain Road, West 
Blossom Road, or Ski Hill Road. No testimony was provided that any real property owner or 
lessee in Section 21 or Section 22 used any other road to access their real estate. The diagram on 
the next page shows the easement road that proceeds from the southwest quarter of Section 21 to 
the northeast quarter of Section 28 to the southeast quarter of Section 21 to the southwest quarter 
of Section 22 where the Capstar and Spectra Site properties are located. 
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Section 27 
The properties involved are either directly or tangentially located near "Blossom 
Mountain" which is approximately two miles as the crow flies from the City of Post Falls, Idaho. 
(a) The Funk Property 
In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk entered into a real estate contract to purchase: 
Parcel A: Government Lot 3, Section 15; 
Parcel B: The Southeast Quarter of Section 21; 
Parcel C: Government Lot 4, Section 22; 
"Southwest quarter, Northwest quarter, and Southeast quarter, Section 22, all m 
Township 50 North, Range 5 west, Boise Meridian." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
Excepted from the property under contract to the Funks was the real property that was 
previously conveyed in Section 22 to GTC in 1966. 
On November 7, 1972, Wilber and Florence Mead and Ethel Blossom conveyed an 
easement for ingress and egress across the Blossom/Meads' real property for the benefit of all 
the land the Funks were purchasing. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). 
The Funks decided to sell the bulk of their real property to a company named Human 
Synergistics in 1975. On July 10, 1975, seven agreements were recorded which reflected the 
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each of the seven contracts the language set forth below was included: 
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and 
adjoining property, in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and 
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 
heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing 
roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, 
improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads. This 
easement is also over similar lands in section 15. 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibits 5-11). 
From the lack of evidence presented, it is inferred that at the time these real estate 
contracts for the purchase and sale of real property were executed, no fulfillment deeds were 
signed. 
The Funks moved out of the area and by 1986 were living in American Falls, Idaho. That 
same year, Mr. Funk applied for a Conditional Use Permit from Kootenai County in order to 
install and operate an F.M. broadcast transmitter and tower facility for radio station KCDA. He 
listed the access to the site as using Signal Point Road (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 59). The Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners approved the conditional use permit and found that: The 
proposed tower would be 280 feet tall and that the legal requirements for notification of adjacent 
property owners had been made for this proposed use on the Funks' segregated five acre parcel. 
In 1988, Harold Funk requested another Conditional Use Permit to build a 40-foot tower 
for microwave and cable television. He listed the "Directions To Site" as using Signal Point 
Road and then traveling over the gravel dirt road (Blossom Mountain Road) (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 60). This site was described as being 50 feet by 200 feet and bordering the existing GTC 
site. The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners found: "4. Access is provided by a private 
road off the Signal Point Road." They further found that the legal requirements for provision of 
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1992, Funks sold their remaining interest in Section 22 to John W. Mack (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 18). On October 29, 1992, the Funks signed a warranty deed in fulfillment of 
their contract and conveyed the southeast quarter of Section 21 to Human Synergistics. (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 19). The deed failed to reserve or except an easement for the benefit of the 
Funks, their successors, or assigns to provide access to the remaining property in Section 22. All 
of the real properties owned by the Funks, their successors, or assigns located in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22 were thus landlocked with no recorded easement. 
On September 20, 1996, Arman and Mary Jane Farmanian, entered into a "Mutual 
Agreement Grant of Easement and Quit Claim Deed" with John W. Mack (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 23). In this agreement it states, "AND WHEREAS, MACK, and MACK'S predecessors 
in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the most southeasterly portion of the 
FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK PROPERTY. This private road is 
sometimes known as Blossom Mountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACCESS ROAD."' 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 23). 
An agreement (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 87) was executed on October 8, 1997, between 
Idaho Forest Industries (a predecessor in interest of the current owner of that portion of Section 
28 that the access road passes through) and Nextel West (the predecessor in interest of Plaintiff 
Spectra Site) to allow access to Nextel West across Section 28. The agreement was for "the 
purpose of ingress, egress, maintaining, altering, replacing, repairing an access road .... " This 
agreement provides that it would also apply to Nextel West's successors and assigns. It is 
uncontroverted that plaintiff Spectra Site is an assignee or successor in interest of Nextel West. 
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Lawrences that there were at least three claimed ingress/egress easements across the real 
property the Lawrences were purchasing. Mr. Lawrence also testified he was aware of a private 
road that was on the real property they were buying. He went on to state that there were 
exceptions listed on the title commitment and he knew the insurance company was not going to 
cover claims made by anyone concerning the easements identified. 
On October 1, 1996, a "Memorandum of Sale Agreement" regarding the Lawrences' 
purchase of 80 acres located in the southeast comer of Section 21 was recorded (See Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 24). A warranty deed conveying title to the Lawrences was recorded August 27, 1998 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 28). The warranty deed provided that the property was "free from all 
encumbrances except. .. easements ofrecord or in view." 
Mr. Lawrence testified that he knew the access road he used did not stop at his property's 
eastern boundary. 
At the time the real property that eventually came into Spectra Site's possession was 
conveyed, it was landlocked and had no recorded easement. 
3. Chain of Title 
The essential chain of title of the Lawrence property is Funks to Human Synergistics; 
Human Synergistics to Johnson & McHugh; Johnson & McHugh to National Associated 
Properties ("NAP"); NAP to the Farmanians; and the Farmanians to the Lawrences. 
The essential chain of title of the Hall property is: Funk to Rasmussen and 
Chamberlain; Rasmussen and Chamberlain to Van Sky; Van Sky to Switzer 
Communications; Switzer Communications to Term Corp.; and Term Corp. to the Halls. 
The plaintiff, Spectra Site, has a leasehold interest in the real propert:y. 




quarter of Section where the Capstar real property is located. 
The court finds that the following facts were proven. At no time did any of the owners, 
1',.,;::,.;::,_,.,;::,, or witnesses state that access was available to any of the Funk property using Mellick 
Road in 1975 at the time the sales took place to Human Synergistics. Mellick Road, as it then 
existed as a developed road, did not access Section 15 in 1975. Mellick Road, even if it had been 
developed, would not have provided ingress and egress to any of the Funk property in Section 21 
or 22 without going outside the Funk property boundaries that existed in 1975. 
The Lawrences have posited that there was access to Mellick Road in 1975 from section 
15. But no persuasive testimony or evidence was submitted to establish this proposition. 
Mr. Lawrence did testify that on one occasion he rode with John Mack, who owned the 
major portion of the southwest quarter of section 22, and did eventually reach Mellick Road. 
This ride occurred long after 1975, however. Mr. Lawrence's testimony was imprecise and 
appeared clouded. His testimony did not demonstrate that access could be made to the developed 
portion of Mellick Road solely by using roads on what formerly was the Funks' real property. 
Further, Mr. Lawrence's testimony at trial was impeached by his previous testimony as well as 
by admitted exhibits. The bias shown by the way he testified was transparent. Mr. Lawrence was 
not a particularly credible witness. 
Testimony and exhibits were admitted concerning the existence of Mellick Road and 
whether it provided access to the Funks through Section 15. After a review of the evidence 
presented, the court finds that the developed portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the 
Funk's real property in Section 15 in 1975. This factual/legal finding is based on the testimony 
of Darius Ruen, who was meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's testimony 
was buttressed by other witness testimony. The court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as being 
D~eN9.43082 136 
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III. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
When the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence, the appellate court will not disturb such findings. Hughes v. Fisher, 
142 Idaho 474, 479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 (2006). The Idaho Supreme Court gives due regard to 
the district court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally 
appear before the court. Id. at 479-80, 129 P.3d at 1228-29 (citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 
225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003)). On appeal, findings of fact will be set aside only if they are 
clearly erroneous. Id. at 479, 129 P.3d at 1228; I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Unlike the Supreme Court's review of a district court's factual fmdings, the Supreme 
Court exercises free review over a district court's conclusions of law. Id. at 480, 129 P.3d at 
1229. In reviewing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court must determine whether the 
legal requirements were correctly applied for an easement to the facts found by the district court. 
Id. 
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Case law in Idaho has referred to two types of "implied easements," an implied easement 
by prior use and an implied easement by necessity. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 
1081 (Ct. App. 1983). In this memorandum decision the term "implied easement" means an 
implied easement by prior use. The term "easement by necessity" as used in this decision is what 
has previously been referred to as an implied easement by necessity. 
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"Implied easements are an exception to the general that easements can only be 
created by an express grant or prescription." 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 75. Implied easements are a 
creature of common law. Id. The law does not always favor implied easements Id. Nevertheless, 
they exist as a matter of public policy because "lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy 
or successful cultivation by a lack of access." Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
542,681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). The primary focus with respect to whether an implied 
easement should be recognized is whether the common owner, at the time of severance, actually 
intended to reserve or grant an easement despite the absence of an express easement. The 
implication being that the grantee, aware of the existence of the quasi-easement, can reasonably 
expect its continuance. See 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 75. 
2. Tracing the History of Implied Easements in Idaho 
Recognizing the general rule that conveying an interest in real property must occur by a 
written instrument, how does the law address the inequity which results when both parties to a 
land sale are aware that the original owner (the grantor) intended to have an easement transferred 
but did not, and the use by the original owner was such that the easement is a necessary part of 
his/her/its use of the remaining real property? In this hypothetical the presumption arises that it 
was the intent of the parties to provide for an easement and thus the grant of the easement is 
"implied" by the circumstances. This presumption conflicts with the general rule that even 
though the necessary easement is apparent and known to the buyer, "[the granter] does not intend 
to reserve the easement on the estate thus alienated without any express reservation" Wilton v. 
Smith, 40 Idaho 81, 85,231 P. 704, 705 (1924). 
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after one piece was sold. The Court mentioned that the legal principle requiring that a grantor 
demonstrate his intent by reserving an easement in the conveyance is supported by "a long line 
of authority" Id. The Wilton decision resolved the conflict between the presumed intent of the 
parties under the circumstances and the general rule of law requiring an express reservation. 
The Wilton court concluded: 
Id. 
[W]e think, however, that an exception to this rule arises 
where it is clearly shown, as in this case, that the easement is one 
of necessity, and it also appears that the owner of the servient 
estate when he purchased the same, had full knowledge of such 
easement and the necessity of its use. 
In reaching its decision, the Wilton court relied on Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 15 8 P. 
1025 (1916), which found that: 
Id. 
Where the owner of one heritage consisting of several parts 
has so adapted them that one derives a benefit from the other, and 
transfers one of them without mention of the incidental burdens of 
one in respect to others, an implied understanding arises that the 
burdens and correlative advantages shall continue as before the 
separation of the title. 
The Wilton court focused on unity of ownership, necessity, the knowledge of the 
easement by the owner of the servient estate, and the intent to convey such an easement. 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Gustafson, 49 Idaho 376, 288 P. 427 (1930), our Supreme 
Court again addressed the issue of an implied easement. In Gustafson, the facts involved the sale 
smaller pieces from a larger parcel without a specific reservation of an easement the 





owner an tract 
employs a part thereof so that he "derives from the other a benefit 
or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one 
in favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement 
exists, such easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment 
of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication." 19 
C. J. p. 914. See, also, 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 352; 9 R. 
C. L. p. 755, § 22; German Savings & Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 
Or. 147, 102 P. 736, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331. 
The Gustafson court relied on Thompson's treatise on real property which outlined the 
three material elements required to be proven to determine that an implied easement should be 
granted when there is no other evidence of intent: 
Id. 
The rule is thus stated by Mr. Thompson: "As a general rule 
there is no implied reservation of an easement in case one sells a 
part of his land over which he has previously exercised a privilege 
in favor of the land he retains, unless the burden is apparent, 
continuous, and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land 
retained." 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 356. See, also, 9 R. C. 
L. p. 765, § 28; 19 C. J. p. 920, § 113; Kallenburg v. Long, 39 Cal. 
App. 731, 179 P. 730; Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 P. 1025. 
The California cases cited seem to hold that strict necessity is not 
essential to establish an implied reservation. 
In Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972) the Court again quoted 
Thompson's treatise with approval as to the material elements required to establish a prima facia 
case for an implied easement. 
In Schultz v. Atkins, the Court addressed the issue of intent and again cited Thompson's 
treatise when it said: 
The creation of such an easement may 'be implied or 
inferred through the presumed intent to the parties based upon the 
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or be implied reason of public policy * * *, or inferred often 
easement'. 2 
IJ¥~~o-h, S 51 
1383, 1387 this court discussed 
requisite elements for creation of an easement by implication: 
'Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra, (151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165) 
discusses the four requirements to establish an implied easement, 
as set out in 1 Thompson, Real Proper (perm. ed. 1939) s 396, at p. 
64 7, quoting therefrom: 
'(1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious 
benefit to the dominant and burden to the servient tenement 
existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the premises by 
the common ovvner L.'1 their altered condition long enough before 
the conveyance to show that the change was intended to be 
permanent; and ( 4) necessity for the easement.' 
97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 948, 951-52 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Thus the Shultz court recognized three ways the intent may be determined in an 
implied easement case: 
1. The intent may be presumed based on the circumstances existing before 
separation; or 
2. Implied by public policy; or 
3. "[I]nferred often fictitiously through long continuous use of the easement." 
Id. at 951, 554 P.2d at 948. 
The issues of intent and knowledge were discussed in the context of proving one of the 
material elements of an implied easement in Davis v. Peacock: 
One of the requirements for establishing an implied 
easement by prior use is that there has been open and continuous 
use of the easement prior to the severance of the dominant and 
servient estates. This requirement ensures that the buyer of the 
servient property will have notice of the preexisting use. 
Consequently, it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer 
who already had notice of its existence. 
133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999), abrogated by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Inv., LLC, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) (emphasis added). 
Intent was also an important factor in Birdv. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350,352,209 P.3d 647, 
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use was intended to at at 
The district court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the 
second element. After considering the terms of the three deeds, the 
district court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that the 
[Grantors] intended to grant an easement to the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in seeking to 
ascertain the [Grantor's J subjective intent. They argue that the 
only inquiry relevant to this element is whether the use of the road 
was apparent and continuous for a long period of time prior to the 
separation of the dominant estate. 
The second element includes as a necessary consideration 
the intent of the grantor at the time the dominant estate was 
separated. The intent to grant or reserve the easement is presumed 
from apparent continuous use for a long period of time prior to 
that separation. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 
951 (1976). The easement is "based on the theory that when 
someone conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is 
required for the beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and 
intends to retain all that is required for the use and enjoyment of 
the land retained." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637,643, 991 P.2d 
362, 368 (1999). Because the intent to grant or reserve the 
easement is a necessary element, there is no logical reason to base 
the decision solely upon the grantor's presumed intent from prior 
use and to exclude other relevant evidence of that intent. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in considering that other 
evidence. 
Id., with emphasis added. 
The Idaho appellate cases involving implied easements generally discuss circumstances 
affecting an owner when there is no direct evidence of the grantor's intent presented. As can be 
seen by the above cases, intent is then inferred or implied by the long permanent use which 
results in the presumption that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement to benefit the 




In order to establish the existence of an implied easement 
by necessity, the claimant "must prove '(l) unity of title and 
subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) 
necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great 
present necessity for the easement.' "Backman v. Lawrence, 147 
Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009) (quoting Bear Island 
Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 725, 874 P.2d 528, 536 
(1994)). We have held that reasonable necessity is sufficient to 
satisfy the second element. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 288, 
246 P.3d 391, 397 (2010) (citing Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 
39, 45-46, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009) (Akers JI)). Reasonable 
necessity is "something less than" great present necessity. Beach 
Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 
P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (citing Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 
643, 991 P.2d 362,368 (1999)). 
A reasonable necessity for an easement may exist even if 
the property is not landlocked. In determining whether reasonable 
necessity exists, the district court must "balance the respective 
convenience, inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts." 
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006) 
(citing Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 
(1950)) [footnote omitted]. In Thomas, though the subject property 
was adjacent to a public road, we affirmed a finding of reasonable 
necessity because, due to the nature of the property, constructing 
access from that road would have required "considerable expense 
and time." Id. In contrast, where an existing road provided ready 
access to the subject property, the easement was not reasonably 
necessary. Akers II, 147 Idaho at 46, 205 P.3d at 1182. Thus, 
reasonable necessity may exist even where there is a possibility for 
alternate access. 
In contrast, great present necessity exists where the claimed 
easement is the only access to the claimant's property. Brown v. 
Miller, 140 Idaho 439,443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004). As the Court of 
Appeals has held, an easement implied by necessity "must not be 
granted if there is an alternate access, though it be expensive or 
inconvenient," because the expense or inconvenience of an 
alternate access is insufficient to demonstrate great present 
necessity. Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 542, 681 
P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). 
easement 
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establish that any such easement must not only lead to a public road but the claimant must have a 
legal right to cross other lands to get to the public road. 
V. ANALYSIS 
A. Implied Easement 
1. The Logical Conflict 
An implied easement arises when two logical and practical concepts collide in property 
law. The first logical concept is that the written instrument of conveyance must set forth an 
easement/subservient interest if the buyer/grantee will not receive an unencumbered fee simple 
title. Wilton, 40 Idaho 81, 231 P. 704 (1924 ). Flying in the face of this logic is the equitable 
underpinning of an implied easement, that is, the fact that people who draft documents make 
mistakes, forget, or do not think everything through. 3 
3 The Restatement (Third) of Property§ 2.12, comment a., Rationale, states: 
Ownership of land is often split into smaller parcels after roads, utility 
lines, wells, and other facilities have been installed that benefit all or several 
parts of the original parcel. If the transaction splitting the ownership is properly 
handled, the conveyances will spell out the rights of each of the new parcels to 
use these facilities. However, transactions are not always properly handled, and 
all too often, a conveyance severing the ownership is silent on the question 
whether the new parcel is entitled to continued use of the other parcel for 
access, utilities, and the like. 
The rule stated in this section is based on the assumption that people 
intend to buy and sell land with the existing utility arrangements, unless they 
make some indication to the contrary. Although grantors might be expected to 
know that they should expressly reserve any use rights they intend to retain 
after severance, experience has shown that too often they do not. Ordinarily, 
servitudes are implied in favor of the grantor as readily as in favor of the grantee 
under the rules stated in this section. However, in cases where the grantor should 
have known of the need to reserve a servitude to continue the prior use, and it 
would be unfair to burden the grantee with the consequences of the grantor's 
neglect, the court may refuse to imply a servitude in favor of the grantor, even 
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But what if it makes logical sense for an easement to be in place? Two examples illustrate 
this concept. First, if a seller and a buyer of real property are both aware that the seller will need 
to have access to remaining property over an existing if both parties to 
provide for such access yet the deed fails to provide for the required easement, the seller should 
not be denied access when the drafter of the documents fails to provide for such access. In the 
second scenario, assuming again that there is a buyer and a seller of real property, but there is no 
showing of intent and no mention is made in the deed for access to the sellers' remaining 
property, it is inequitable to deny the seller access when it was obvious from a review of the 
circumstances surrounding the sale and the use of the road that access should have been 
included. In this second example, based on the facts surrounding the transaction, the law 
presumes that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement in favor of the grantor; or 
though it would have implied the servitude in favor of the grantee. 
The rule stated in this section is not based solely on the presumed 
actual intent of the parties. It furthers the policy of protecting reasonable 
expectations, as well as actual intent, of parties to land transactions. It also 
promotes efficient use of resources by avoiding the unnecessary costs that would 
be involved in reestablishing entitlements to make the prior uses, or duplicating 
the facilities. In the case of underground utilities, it applies even though neither 
party knew of the prior use. 
Comment "h" provides: 
No contrary intent expressed or implied. Implication of a servitude 
under the rule stated in this section is based on what the parties probably 
intended or had reasonable grounds to expect. The implication does not arise if 
the facts or circumstances of the conveyance indicate that the parties did not 
intend to create a servitude to continue the prior use, or that the parties did 
intend to create rights to terminate the existing utility arrangements. Inclusion of 
a warranty against encumbrances may give some indication that no servitude 
was reserved in favor of the grantor, but is not conclusive. Economic 
consequences to both parties may be relevant indicators of their expectations. If 
existence of a servitude would severely limit the uses of the servient estate, and 
replacement of the utilities would not be very expensive, a servitude was 
probably neither intended or expected. Conversely, if replacement of the 
facilities would be very expensive, and the servitude's existence would have a 
negligible impact on the burdened estate, a servitude probably was intended or 
expected. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 2.12 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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Applying to 
In this case, the parties agree that there was unity of title and that Funks owned the 
portions agreed to be conveyed to Human Synergistics in 1975. 
In July of 1975, there was only one practical way to access the real property owned by the 
Funks in Section 21 and 22 and that was by using Signal Point Road. From Signal Point Road there 
was only one private road in existence for ingress and egress to the Funks' Section 21 and 22 
properties, the private road which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
The seven real estate sales agreements signed by the Funks and Human Synergistics show 
that both the buyer and sellers were aware of the access and the need for an easement for the benefit 
of the Funks. This fact is demonstrated by paragraph 5 of each sales contract which provides that 
the transfer ofland to Human Synergistics is "subject to ... an ingress egress easement." The grant of 
an easement to Human Synergistics is reflected in the phrase in paragraph 5 which states, "including 
an ingress egress easement." The facts presented in this case establish that the buyer, Human 
Synergistics, had knowledge of the easement road and the need for the use of the easement by both 
the buyer and sellers. (See Plaintiff's Exhibits 5 -11, which are all dated July 10, 1975, and recorded 
as consecutive instrument numbers 672112-672118). 
While the language "subject to ... an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining 
property in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor" was not enough to expressly convey an 
easement, it demonstrated the intent of the respective parties to allow the Funks to use the existing 
easement road off of Signal Point Road to access their remaining real property in Section 22. 
11iis court recognizes the intent of the parties to the transaction must either be 
established or implied. explained in Davis v. Peacock, the requirement of proving "open and 
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The Funks and Human Synergistics knew of the only existing easement and intended by 
their contract to make it permanent. There is no need to resort to inferences, presumptions, or legal 
fiction to imply an easement when the parties' actual intent is proven. As stated in Bird v. Bidwell, 
"[b ]ecause the intent to grant or reserve the easement is a necessary element, there is no logical 
reason to base the decision solely upon the grantee's presumed intent from prior use and to exclude 
other evidence ofthis intent." 147 Idaho 350,352,209 P.3d 647, 649 (2009). 
Obviously, Human Synergistics had knowledge of the pre-existing use. As stated in Davis v. 
Peacock, "[c]onsequently it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer who already had notice 
of its existence." 133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362,366 (1999). 
As to the third requirement to prove an implied easement, that "the easement must be 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate" the facts are uncontroverted 
that the road easement in question was the only access to the real property in the southeast comer of 
Section 22 at the time of severance in 1975. This court concludes the easement was reasonably 
necessary. 
3. An Implied Easement is Granted 
Spectra Site proved that it is entitled to an implied easement across the existing road on the 
Lawrences' real property in Section 21.4 This is an appurtenant easement and runs with the land. 
See Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293,302, 127 P.3d 196,205 (2005) (Akers I). 
4 The Lawrences want the court to ignore the actual intent of the parties as manifested in the seven sale agreements 
and consider only the number of times the Funks used their property to determine the actual intent and knowledge of 
the parties. This same argument was used in Bird, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647 (2009) and rejected. It would truly 
be a bitter irony to have the Funks and their successors precluded from having an implied easement when the 
buyer's and seller's knowledge reflected not only the existence of the actual easement road but the buyer's intent for 
its real property to be subject to the easement. 




1289, 1293 (1991 ), the Court stated, "the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an 
easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the 
easement." The Abbott Court, however, further expounds on scope by providing "an easement 
granted or reserved in general terms without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited 
reasonable use." Id. Therefore, as long as the use of the easement is reasonably necessary to 
provide access to the properties and tenants in Section 22, there are no strictures on such use and 
this court declines the invitation to impose restrictions at this stage of the proceedings. 
A practical consideration for the parties is the width of the easement. Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, 
which is a grant of easement from Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., to the Lawrences' predecessors in 
interest, Don E. Johnston and Fern A. Johnston (husband and wife) and John McHugh and Mary 
Anne McHugh (husband and wife) sets the easement width on the roadway at 40 feet in width. 
Further, on July 10, 1996, National Associated Properties ("NAP") signed an easement for ingress, 
egress, and utility purposes, for a road that was 40 feet in width (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22). NAP was a 
predecessor in interest of the Lawrences and the "easement" granted refers to the road in this case. 
Considering the snowfall that is faced by users, the need to clear a way through the snow so 
the road can be usable, the needs for access of equipment or cranes to service the site, and the 
previous recognition of the 40 foot wide roadway, the court establishes the width of the easement 
road through the Lawrences' real property as being 40 feet wide. 
136 
Necessity 
We turn next to appellants' assertion that they have an 
implied easement by "way of necessity." Such necessity can arise 
when the owner of land conveys part thereof to another, and the 
part conveyed is without ingress or egress except over the lands 
retained. Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra; Martino v. Fleenor, 148 
Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo.1961). The Idaho Supreme Court, 
quoting from Martino, and from 17 A Am.Jur. 668-69, Easements, 
§ 58, said in Burley Brick & Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 
333,335,629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981): 
Although a way of necessity is sometimes confused with an 
easement arising, on severance of title, from a pre-existing use, 
there is a definite distinction between them, mainly because a way 
of necessity does not rest on a pre-existing use but on the need for 
a way across the granted or reserved premises. A way of necessity 
is an easement arising from an implied grant or implied 
reservation; it is a common-law origin and is supported by the rule 
of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the 
application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case ... 
[I]t is [of] a common-law origin and is supported by the 
rule of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit 
for occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of 
the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case. 




severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Machado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho at 219, 
280 P.3d at 722 (2012). 
The parties agree that there was unity of title when the Funks sold their property to 
Human Synergistics in July of 1975. 
As to the "reasonable" necessity at the time of severance, the facts as testified to by 
Darius Ruen and other witnesses firmly establish that there was only one way to access the 
Funks' remaining property in section 22 after it became landlocked and that was by way of 
Blossom Mountain Road, the road which is the subject of this litigation. The testimony is 
unequivocal that the Funks real property in section 22 was landlocked. Therefore, there was 
reasonable necessity at the time of severance in 197 5. 
The last material element, "great present necessity for the easement" was also 
established. Presently, there is no other road or easement that provides access to the Halls' 
(Spectra Site's) parcel other than the easement road that passes through the Lawrences' real 
property in the southeast quarter of Section 21. 
2. Access to a Public Road 
In Capstar III, the Court provided: 
Nor is it entirely clear how the district court found the 
easement by necessity over the Lawrences' land when that 
easement would not, in fact, lead to a public road. As the 
Lawrences point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel 
over the road in Section 28 and where "land over which the way of 
necessity is claimed has no access to a public road," no necessity 
can arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 203 Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 
(1983). Therefore, the district court erred in detennining this issue 
on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence presented 
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a genmne the 
proved an easement by U'-"V"'~'"''" 
at 
Capstar the 
claiming an easement by necessity prove that the "way of necessity" results in "access to a 
public road." Id. 
Unlike Capstar, the Halls have an easement through section 28. This was acquired when 
Idaho Forest Industries, Stimson Lumber's predecessor, granted an easement to Nextel West 
Corp., its successors and assigns in 1997 (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 87). That document provided 
the Halls and their tenants legal access over Section 28. Thus, Spectra Site has access to a public 
road. Having proven all of the elements for an easement by necessity, Spectra Site is awarded an 
easement by necessity. 
C. Prescriptive Easement 
Having concluded that Spectra Site is entitled to both an implied easement and an 
easement by necessity, the issue of whether the plaintiff proved a right to a prescriptive easement 
is not necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Spectra Site proved its right to an easement which is 40 feet in width for ingress, egress, 
and utilities over and adjacent to the existing road across the Lawrences' property in section 21, 
Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Kootenai County Idaho. The centerline of the existing road 
shall be the centerline of the 40 foot wide easement. The easement shall be for unlimited 
reasonable use. 
In addition, Spectra Site is granted a permanent injunction. The Lawrences, their agents, 




The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Capstar III adds an additional requirement for a 
claimant to prove it is entitled to an easement by necessity: that the easement results in access to 
a public road. As to its claim for an easement by necessity, Spectra Site did prove it had a legal 
right to use the land in Section 28 to obtain access to a public road. Having proven all material 
elements to establish an easement by necessity, such easement is ordered. 
Regarding Spectra Site's prescriptive easement allegations, the court determines that it is 
not necessary to decide this issue in light of the fmding in favor of Spectra Site on the implied 
easement and easement by necessity issues. 
The court determines that Spectra Site is the prevailing party and awards costs to Spectra 
Site concerning the issues that were tried. 
To effectuate this decision, Spectra Site is ordered to conduct a survey of the easement as 
awarded on the real property in section 21 owned by the Lawrences and serve a copy of the 
completed survey to counsel for the Lawrences and provide a copy to the court. The Lawrences 
shall have 30 days upon receipt of the survey within which to object. If there is an objection the 
court will set the matter for hearing at a time convenient to both court and counsel. If there is no 
objection Spectra Site is ordered to submit a final judgment to the court for signature forthwith if 
no other court proceedings are required. 
Dated this ~ay of September, 2013. 
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THE SEPTEMBER 25, 2013, 
DECISION IS WITHDRAWN 
DUE TO A SCRIVEl"{ER'S 
ERROR.] 
After a six-day bench trial, the determination is made that Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 
proved its claims for an implied easement and an easement by necessity. No prescriptive easement 
determination is necessary as plaintiff is awarded an easement by implication and necessity. A 
permanent injunction is granted in favor of the plaintiff precluding the Lawrences from interfering 
with the easement. Plaintiff is found to be the prevailing party and is awarded costs. 
Susan Weeks, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., represented Spectra Site Communications, 
Inc. 
Douglas Marfice and Theron DeSmet, RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP, represented Doug and 
Brenda Lawrence. 
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
causes 
of action. Tower alleged the existence of an express easement, or in the alternative, easements 
by implication, necessity, and prescription. Additionally, Tower alleged causes of action for 
injunctive relief and breach of contract. 
On August 17, 2004, Tower filed its first motion for summary judgment only with respect 
to the express easement claim. 
On May 27, 2005, Judge Mitchell entered an "Order Granting Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Entering Decree of Quiet Title," wherein the court entered summary judgment for 
Tower on the express easement cause of action. The Lawrences appealed. On January 26, 2007, 
the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision, Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 
152 P.3d 581 (2007) (Tower I), reversing the order granting summary judgment and remanded 
the case. 
On May 14, 2007, Tower filed a renewed motion for summary judgment arguing that 
Tower had easements by implication, necessity and prescription. On September 10, 2007, the 
Lawrences filed their Motion to Amend Answer. 
On November 13, 2007, Tower filed a motion to substitute the real party in interest, 
Spectra Site, LLC. On November 27, 2007, the court entered a pre-trial order and reset the trial 
to commence on May 12, 2008. 
On February 6, 2008, a "Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Substitute Real Party in 
1 Tower Asset Sub Inc. assigned its interests in the subject communication tower to Spectra Site, LLC, which in tum 
assigned its rights to Spectra Site Communications, Inc. 
oc:Ji?ag~c2 43002 82 of 136 
Memorandum Decision and was entered. Summary 
statute of limitations were not viable. The previous court also substituted Spectra Site, LLC as 
the real party in interest.2 
On March 19, 2008, the Lawrences appealed the memorandum decision and order. On 
August 25, 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision, Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 149 Idaho 621, 238 P.3d 221 (2010) (Tower II), dismissing the appeal because no 
final judgment had been entered in the case. 
On remand, the matter was assigned to District Judge Lansing Haynes. Acting in his role 
as administrative judge, he assigned the case to Judge Steve Yerby. On June 11, 2013, a six-day 
bench trial began. It concluded on June 18, 2013. The trial was combined with Capstar Radio 
Operating Company v. Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, Kootenai County Case No. CV-02-7671, 
as there were common issues, common witnesses, and the same defendants in each action. The 
issues tried were equitable and therefore could only be determined by the court. Other non-
equitable issues for which a jury trial was demanded were bifurcated. 
This court has carefolly reviewed and considered the pleadings, evidence, and briefing, 
and now enters its Memorandum Decision and Order, which shall constitute findings of fact and 
conclusions of law pursuant to I.R.C.P. 52(a). Any of the following findings of fact that should 
be denominated as a conclusion of law shall be deemed to be a conclusion of law. Any of the 
following conclusions of law that should be qenominated a finding of fact shall be deemed a 
finding of fact. 
2 On July 5, 2012, Spectra Site, LLC filed its First Amended Complaint, with leave of the court, naming Spectra Site 
Communications, Inc. as the plaintiff and real party in interest. 
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FACTS 
Uncontested Pertinent 
The plaintiff, Spectra Site, is a lessee of the Halls, who own real property on Blossom 
Mountain. The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Hall 
parcel is located to the east of the Lawrence parcel in the southwest quarter of Section 22. 
Section 21 is directly west of Section 22. Both the Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were part 
of a iarger tract of land that was once owned by Harold and Marlene Funk (the "Funks"). The 
Funks purchased their real property in 1969, which consisted of land in Section 15, Section 21, 
and Section 22. All the lands involved in this case are located in Township 50 North, Range 5 
West, Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. 
2. Access and Chain of Title 
There was no testimony contesting the following facts, which were established by the 
admission of exhibits and/or the testimony of the witnesses. For ease of understanding, these 
facts are placed in chronological order. 
The only public road providing access to the private easement road, which then accesses 
all of the real property which is subject to this litigation, is Signal Point Road. This easement 
road that connects to Signal Point Road has been referred to as Blossom Mountain Road, West 
Blossom Road, or Ski Hill Road. No testimony was provided that any real property owner or 
lessee in Section 21 or Section 22 used any other road to access their real estate. The diagram on 
the next page shows the easement road that proceeds from the southwest quarter of Section 21 to 
the northeast quarter of Section 28 to the southeast quarter of Section 21 to the southwest quarter 
of Section 22 where the Capstar and Spectra Site properties are located. 
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Section 27 
The properties involved are either directly or tangentially located near "Blossom 
Mountain" which is approximately two miles as the crow flies from the City of Post Falls, Idaho. 
(a) The Funk Property 
In 1969, Harold and Marlene Funk entered into a real estate contract to purchase: 
Parcel A: Government Lot 3, Section 15; 
Parcel B: The Southeast Quarter of Section 21; 
Parcel C: Government Lot 4, Section 22; 
"Southwest quarter, Northwest quarter, and Southeast quarter, Section 22, all m 
Township 50 North, Range 5 west, Boise Meridian." (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
Excepted from the property under contract to the Funks was the real property that was 
previously conveyed in Section 22 to GTC in 1966. 
On November 7, 1972, Wilber and Florence Mead and Ethel Blossom conveyed an 
easement for ingress and egress across the Blossom/Meads' real property for the benefit of all 
the land the Funks were purchasing. (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 4). 
The Funks decided to sell the bulk of their real property to a company named Human 
Synergistics in 1975. On July 10, 1975, seven agreements were recorded which reflected the 
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contracts for the real property Section and Section 
5 as as most quarter 
was 
In each of the seven contracts the language set forth below was included: 
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and 
adjoining property, in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and 
including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 
heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing 
roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, 
improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads. This 
easement is also over similar lands in section 15. 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibits 5-11). 
From the lack of evidence presented, it is inferred that at the time these real estate 
contracts for the purchase and sale of real property were executed, no fulfillment deeds were 
signed. 
The Funks moved out of the area and by 1986 were living in American Falls, Idaho. That 
same year, Mr. Funk applied for a Conditional Use Permit from Kootenai County in order to 
install and operate an F.M. broadcast transmitter and tower facility for radio station KCDA. He 
listed the access to the site as using Signal Point Road (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 59). The Kootenai 
County Board of Commissioners approved the conditional use permit and found that: The 
proposed tower would be 280 feet tall and that the legal requirements for notification of adjacent 
property owners had been made for this proposed use on the Funks' segregated five acre parcel. 
In 1988, Harold Funk requested another Conditional Use Permit to build a 40-foot tower 
for microwave and cable television. He listed the "Directions To Site" as using Signal Point 
Road and then traveling over the gravel dirt road (Blossom Mountain Road) (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 60). This site was described as being 50 feet by 200 feet and bordering the existing OTC 
site. The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners found: "4. Access is provided by a private 
road off the Signal Point Road." They further found that the legal requirements for provision of 
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to adjacent property owners were satisfied, that the demand conditional use 
towers 
October 1992, the Funks sold their remaining interest in Section 22 to John W. Mack (See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 18). On October 29, 1992, the Funks signed a warranty deed in fulfillment of 
their contract and conveyed the southeast quarter of Section 21 to Human Synergistics. (See 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 19). The deed failed to reserve or except an easement for the benefit of the 
Funks, their successors, or assigns to provide access to the remaining property in Section 22. All 
of the real properties owned by the Funks, their successors, or assigns located in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22 were thus landlocked with no recorded easement. 
On September 20, 1996, Annan and Mary Jane Farmanian, entered into a "Mutual 
Agreement Grant of Easement and Quit Claim Deed" with John W. Mack (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 23). In this agreement it states, "AND WHEREAS, MACK, and MACK'S predecessors 
in interest have used a preexisting private road traversing the most southeasterly portion of the 
FARMANIAN PROPERTY to gain access to the MACK PROPERTY. This private road is 
sometimes known as Blossom Mountain Road (hereinafter referred to as the 'ACCESS ROAD."' 
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 23). 
An agreement (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 87) was executed on October 8, 1997, between 
Idaho Forest Industries ( a predecessor in interest of the current owner of that portion of Section 
28 that the access road passes through) and Nextel West (the predecessor in interest of Plaintiff 
Spectra Site) to allow access to Nextel West across Section 28. The agreement was for "the 
purpose of ingress, egress, maintaining, altering, replacing, repairing an access road .... " This 
agreement provides that it would also apply to Nextel West's successors and assigns. It is 
uncontroverted that plaintiff Spectra Site is an assignee or successor in interest of Nextel West. 
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a 
Lawrences that there were at least three claimed ingress/egress easements across the real 
property the Lawrences were purchasing. Mr. Lawrence also testified he was aware of a private 
road that was on the real property t.1.ey were buying. He went on to state that there were 
exceptions listed on the title commitment and he knew the insurance company was not going to 
cover claims made by anyone concerning the easements identified. 
On October 1, 1996, a "Memorandum of Sale Agreement" regarding the Lawrences' 
purchase of 80 acres located in the southeast comer of Section 21 was recorded (See Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 24). A warranty deed conveying title to the Lawrences was recorded August 27, 1998 
(See Plaintiffs Exhibit 28). The warranty deed provided that the property was "free from all 
encumbrances except ... easements of record or in view." 
Mr. Lawrence testified that he knew the access road he used did not stop at his property's 
eastern boundary. 
At the time the real property that eventually came into Spectra Site's possession was 
conveyed, it was landlocked and had no recorded easement. 
3. Chain of Title 
The essential chain of title of the Lawrence property is Funks to Human Synergistics; 
Human Synergistics to Johnson & McHugh; Johnson & McHugh to National Associated 
Properties ("NAP"); NAP to the Farrnanians; and the Farrnanians to the Lawrences. 
The essential chain of title of the Hall property is: Funk to Rasmussen and 
Chamberlain; Rasmussen and Chamberlain to Van Sky; Van Sky to Switzer 
Communications; Switzer Communications to Term Corp.; and Term Corp. to the Halls. 
plaintiff, Spectra Site, has a leasehold interest in the real property. 
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B. Mellick Road 
assert 
access 
southwest quarter of Section 22, where the Spectra Site real property is located. 
The court finds that the following facts were proven. At no time did any of the owners, 
lessees, or witnesses state that access was available to any of the Fu.11.k property using Mellick 
Road in 1975 at the time the sales took place to Human Synergistics. Mellick Road, as it then 
existed as a developed road, did not access Section 15 in 197 5. Mellick Road, even if it had been 
developed, would not have provided ingress and egress to any of the Funk property in Section 21 
or 22 without going outside the Funk property boundaries that existed in 1975. 
The Lawrences have posited that there was access to Mellick Road in 1975 from section 
15. But no persuasive testimony or evidence was submitted to establish this proposition. 
Mr. Lawrence did testify that on one occasion he rode with John Mack, who owned the 
major portion of the southwest quarter of section 22, and did eventually reach Mellick Road. 
This ride occurred long after 1975, however. Mr. Lawrence's testimony was imprecise and 
appeared clouded. His testimony did not demonstrate that access could be made to the developed 
portion of Mellick Road solely by using roads on what formerly was the Funks' real property. 
Further, Mr. Lawrence's testimony at trial was impeached by his previous testimony as well as 
by admitted exhibits. The bias shown by the way he testified was transparent. Mr. Lawrence was 
not a particularly credible witness. 
Testimony and exhibits were admitted concerning the existence of Mellick Road and 
whether it provided access to the Funks through Section 15. After a review of the evidence 
presented, the court finds that the developed portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the 
Funk's real property in Section 15 in 1975. This factual/legal finding is based on the testimony 
of Darius Ruen, who was meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's testimony 
was buttressed by other witness testimony. The court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as being 
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credible and to court further 
access 
ID. STANDARDOFREVIEW 
When the trial court's factual findings are supported by substantial and competent, 
though conflicting, evidence, the appellate court will not disturb such findings. Hughes v. Fisher, 
142 Idaho 474, 479, 129 P.3d 1223, 1228 (2006). The Idaho Supreme Court gives due regard to 
the district court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses who personally 
appear before the court. Id. at 479-80, 129 P.3d at 1228-29 (citing Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 
225, 229, 76 P.3d 969, 973 (2003)). On appeal, findings of fact will be set aside only if they are 
clearly erroneous. Id. at 479, 129 P.3d at 1228; I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Unlike the Supreme Court's review of a district court's factual :findings, the Supreme 
Court exercises free review over a district court's conclusions of law. Id. at 480, 129 P.3d at 
1229. In reviewing the district court's decision, the Supreme Court must determine whether the 
legal requirements were correctly applied for an easement to the facts found by the district court. 
Id. 
IV. APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Case law in Idaho has referred to two types of "implied easements," an implied easement 
by prior use and an implied easement by necessity. Cordwell v. Smith, 105 Idaho 71, 665 P.2d 
1081 (Ct. App. 1983). In this memorandum decision the term "implied easement" means an 
implied easement by prior use. The term "easement by necessity" as used in this decision is what 




"Implied easements are an exception to the general rule that easements can only be 
created by an express grant or prescription." 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 75. Implied easements are a 
creature of common law. Id. The law does not always favor implied easements Id. Nevertheless, 
they exist as a matter of public policy because "lands should not be rendered unfit for occupancy 
or successful cultivation by a lack of access." Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 
542,681 P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). The primary focus with respect to whether an implied 
easement should be recognized is whether the common owner, at the time of severance, actually 
intended to reserve or grant an easement despite the absence of an express easement. The 
implication being that the grantee, aware of the existence of the quasi-easement, can reasonably 
expect its continuance. See 28A C.J.S. Easements§ 75. 
2. Tracing the History of Implied Easements in Idaho 
Recognizing the general rule that conveying an interest in real property must occur by a 
written instrument, how does the law address the inequity which results when both parties to a 
land sale are aware that the original owner (the grantor) intended to have an easement transferred 
but did not, and the use by the original owner was such that the easement is a necessary part of 
his/her/its use of the remaining real property? In this hypothetical the presumption arises that it 
was the intent of the parties to provide for an easement and thus the grant of the easement is 
"implied" by the circumstances. This presumption conflicts with the general rule that even 
though the necessary easement is apparent and known to the buyer, "[the grantor] does not intend 
to reserve the easement on the estate thus alienated without any express reservation" Wilton v. 
Smith, 40 Idaho 81, 85,231 P. 704, 705 (i924). 
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earliest case found concerning the topic of an "implied easement" is Wilton v. 
an owner two 
use 
after one piece was sold. The Court mentioned that the legal principle requiring that a granter 
demonstrate his intent by reserving an easement in the conveyance is supported by "a long line 
of authority" Id. The Wilton decision resolved the conflict between the presumed intent of the 
parties under the circumstances and the general rule of law requiring an express reservation. 
The Wilton court concluded: 
Id. 
[W]e think, however, that an exception to this rule arises 
where it is clearly shown, as in this case, that the easement is one 
of necessity, and it also appears that the owner of the servient 
estate when he purchased the same, had full knowledge of such 
easement and the necessity of its use. 
In reaching its decision, the Wilton court relied on Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 P. 
I 025 (1916), which found that: 
Id. 
Where the owner of one heritage consisting of several parts 
has so adapted them that one derives a benefit from the other, and 
transfers one of them without mention of the incidental burdens of 
one in respect to others, an implied understanding arises that the 
burdens and correlative advantages shall continue as before the 
separation of the title. 
The Wilton court focused on unity of ownership, necessity, the knowledge of the 
easement by the owner of the servient estate, and the intent to convey such an easement. 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Gustafson, 49 Idaho 376, 288 P. 427 (1930), our Supreme 
Court again addressed the issue of an implied easement. In Gustafson, the facts involved the sale 
of smaller pieces from a larger parcel without a specific reservation of an easement for the 
benefit of the granter. There apparently was no testimony concerning the grantor's intent at the 
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an easement 
p. ovvner an tract 
employs a part thereof so that he "derives from the other a benefit 
or advantage of a continuous and apparent nature, and sells the one 
in favor of which such continuous and apparent quasi easement 
exists, such easement being necessary to the reasonable enjoyment 
of the property granted, will pass to the grantee by implication." 19 
C. J. p. 914. See, also, 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 352; 9 R. 
C. L. p. 755, § 22; German Savings & Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 
Or. 147, 102 P. 736, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 331. 
Id. 
The Gustafson court relied on Thompson's treatise on real property which outlined the 
three material elements required to be proven to determine that an implied easement should be 
granted when there is no other evidence of intent: 
Id. 
The rule is thus stated by Mr. Thompson: "As a general rule 
there is no implied reservation of an easement in case one sells a 
part of his land over which he has previously exercised a privilege 
in favor of the land he retains, unless the burden is apparent, 
continuous, and strictly necessary for the enjoyment of the land 
retained." 1 Thompson on Real Property, § 356. See, also, 9 R. C. 
L. p. 765, § 28; 19 C. J. p. 920, § 113; Kallenburg v. Long, 39 Cal. 
App. 731, 179 P. 730; Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7, 158 P. 1025. 
The California cases cited seem to hold that strict necessity is not 
essential to establish an implied reservation. 
In Close v. Rensink, 95 Idaho 72, 76,501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972) the Court again quoted 
Thompson's treatise with approval as to the material elements required to establish a prima facia 
case for an implied easement. 
In Schultz v. Atkins, the Court addressed the issue of intent and again cited Thompson's 
treatise when it said: 
The creation of such an easement may 'be implied or 
inferred through the presumed intent to the parties based upon the 
COurt Ul"1'vU;)C>\,.,U 
requisite elements for creation of an easement by implication: 
'Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra, (151 Colo. 481, 379 P.2d 165) 
discusses the four requirements to establish an implied easement, 
as set out in 1 Thompson, Real Proper (perm. ed. 1939) s 396, at p. 
64 7, quoting therefrom: 
'(1) Unity and subsequent separation of title; (2) obvious 
benefit to the dominant and burden to the servient tenement 
existing at the time of the conveyance; (3) use of the premises by 
the common owner in their altered condition long enough before 
the conveyance to show that the change was intended to be 
permanent; and ( 4) necessity for the easement.' 
97 Idaho 770, 773-74, 554 P.2d 948, 951-52 (1976) (emphasis added). 
Thus the Shultz court recognized three ways the intent may be determined in an 
implied easement case: 
1. The intent may be presumed based on the circumstances existing before 
separation; or 
2. Implied by public policy; or 
3. "[I]nferred often fictitiously through long continuous use of the easement." 
Id. at 951, 554 P.2d at 948. 
The issues of intent and knowledge were discussed in the context of proving one of the 
material elements of an implied easement in Davis v. Peacock: 
One of the requirements for establishing an implied 
easement by prior use is that there has been open and continuous 
use of the easement prior to the severance of the dominant and 
servient estates. This requirement ensures that the buyer of the 
servient property will have notice of the preexisting use. 
Consequently, it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer 
who already had notice of its existence. 
133 Idaho 637, 641, 991 P.2d 362, 366 (1999), abrogated by Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Inv., LLC, 226 P.3d 1263 (2010) (emphasis added). 
Intent was also an important factor in Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 352, 209 647, 
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use was to at at 
The district court held that the Plaintiffs failed to prove the 
second element. After considering the terms of the three deeds, the 
district court found that the Plaintiffs had failed to prove that the 
[Grantors] intended to grant an easement to the Plaintiffs. The 
Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in seeking to 
ascertain the [Grantor's J subjective intent. They argue that the 
only inquiry relevant to this element is whether the use of the road 
was apparent and continuous for a long period of time prior to the 
separation of the dominant estate. 
The second element includes as a necessary consideration 
the intent of the grantor at the time the dominant estate was 
separated. The intent to grant or reserve the easement is presumed 
from apparent continuous use for a long period of time prior to 
that separation. Shultz v. Atkins, 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 
951 (1976). The easement is "based on the theory that when 
someone conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is 
required for the beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and 
intends to retain all that is required for the use and enjoyment of 
the land retained." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 643, 991 P.2d 
362, 368 (1999). Because the intent to grant or reserve the 
easement is a necessary element, there is no logical reason to base 
the decision solely upon the grantor 1s presumed intent from prior 
use and to exclude other relevant evidence of that intent. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in considering that other 
evidence. 
Id., with emphasis added. 
an implied 
The Idaho appellate cases involving implied easements generally discuss circumstances 
affecting an owner when there is no direct evidence of the grantor's intent presented. As can be 
seen by the above cases, intent is then inferred or implied by the long permanent use which 
results in the presumption that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement to benefit the 
remaining real estate held by the grantor. 
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Necessity 
In order to establish the existence of an implied easement 
by necessity, the claimant "must prove '(1) unity of title and 
subsequent separation of the dominant and servient estates; (2) 
necessity of the easement at the time of severance; and (3) great 
present necessity for the easement.' "Backman v. Lawrence, 147 
Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009) (quoting Bear Island 
Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717,725,874 P.2d 528,536 
(1994)). We have held that reasonable necessity is sufficient to 
satisfy the second element. Coward v. Hadley, 150 Idaho 282, 288, 
246 P.3d 391, 397 (2010) (citing Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 
39, 45-46, 205 P.3d 1175, 1181-82 (2009) (Akers JI)). Reasonable 
necessity is "something less than" great present necessity. Beach 
Lateral Water Users Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 Idaho 600, 605, 130 
P.3d 1138, 1143 (2006) (citing Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 
643, 991 P.2d 362, 368 (1999)). 
A reasonable necessity for an easement may exist even if 
the property is not landlocked. In determining whether reasonable 
necessity exists, the district court must "balance the respective 
convenience, inconvenience, costs, and other pertinent facts." 
Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho 635, 638, 132 P.3d 392, 395 (2006) 
(citing Eisenbarth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266, 270, 215 P.2d 812, 814 
(1950)) [footnote omitted]. In Thomas, though the subject property 
was adjacent to a public road, we affirmed a finding of reasonable 
necessity because, due to the nature of the property, constructing 
access from that road would have required "considerable expense 
and time." Id In contrast, where an existing road provided ready 
access to the subject property, the easement was not reasonably 
necessary. Akers II, 147 Idaho at 46, 205 P.3d at 1182. Thus, 
reasonable necessity may exist even where there is a possibility for 
alternate access. 
In contrast, great present necessity exists where the claimed 
easement is the only access to the claimant's property. Brown v. 
Miller, 140 Idaho 439,443, 95 P.3d 57, 61 (2004). As the Court of 
Appeals has held, an easement implied by necessity "must not be 
granted if there is an alternate access, though it be expensive or 
inconvenient," because the expense or inconvenience of an 
alternate access is insufficient to demonstrate great present 
necessity. Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,542,681 
P.2d 1010, 1017 (Ct. App. 1984). 
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it must 
establish that any such easement must not only lead to a public road but the claimant must have a 
legal right to cross other lands to get to the public road. 
V.ANALYSIS 
A. Implied Easement 
1. The Logical Conflict 
An implied easement arises when two logical and practical concepts collide in property 
law. The first logical concept is that the written instrument of conveyance must set forth an 
easement/subservient interest if the buyer/grantee will not receive an unencumbered fee simple 
title. Wilton, 40 Idaho 81, 231 P. 704 (1924 ). Flying in the face of this logic is the equitable 
underpinning of an implied easement, that is, the fact that people who draft documents make 
mistakes, forget, or do not think everything through. 3 
3 The Restatement (Third) of Property § 2.12, comment a., Rationale, states: 
Ownership of land is often split into smaller parcels after roads, utility 
lines, wells, and other facilities have been instaiied that benefit all or several 
parts of the original parcel. If the transaction splitting the ownership is properly 
handled, the conveyances will spell out the rights of each of the new parcels to 
use these facilities. However, transactions are not always properly handled, and 
all too often, a conveyance severing the ownership is silent on the question 
whether the new parcel is entitled to continued use of the other parcel for 
access, utilities, and the like. 
The rule stated in this section is based on the assumption that people 
intend to buy and sell land with the existing utility arrangements, unless they 
make some indication to the contrary. Although grantors might be expected to 
know that they should expressly reserve any use rights they intend to retain 
after severance, experience has shown that too often they do not. Ordinarily, 
servitudes are implied in favor of the grantor as readily as in favor of the grantee 
under the rules stated in this section. However, in cases where the grantor should 
have kr,own of the need to reserve a servitude to continue t.1:le prior use, and it 
would be unfair to burden the grantee with the consequences of the grantor's 
neglect, the court may refuse to imply a servitude in favor of the grantor, even 
97 
an easement to be 
are 
access to over an 
provide for such access yet the deed fails to provide for the required easement, the seller should 
not be denied access when the drafter of the documents fails to provide for such access. In the 
second scenario, assuming again that there is a buyer and a seller ofreal property, but there is no 
showing of intent and no mention is made in the deed for access to the sellers' remaining 
property, it is inequitable to deny the seller access when it was obvious from a review of the 
circumstances surrounding the sale and the use of the road that access should have been 
included. In this second example, based on the facts surrounding the transaction, the law 
presumes that it was the intent of the parties to create an easement in favor of the grantor; or 
though it would have implied the servitude in favor of the grantee. 
The rule stated in this section is not based solely on the presumed 
actual intent of the parties. It furthers the policy of protecting reasonable 
expectations, as well as actual intent, of parties to land transactions. It also 
promotes efficient use of resources by avoiding the unnecessary costs that would 
be involved in reestablishing entitlements to make the prior uses, or duplicating 
the facilities. In the case of underground utilities, it applies even though neither 
party knew of the prior use. 
Comment "h" provides: 
No contrary intent expressed or impiied. Implication of a ser,ritude 
under the rule stated in this section is based on what the parties probably 
intended or had reasonable grounds to expect. The implication does not arise if 
the facts or circumstances of the conveyance indicate that the parties did not 
intend to create a servitude to continue the prior use, or that the parties did 
intend to create rights to terminate the existing utility arrangements. Inclusion of 
a warranty against encumbrances may give some indication that no servitude 
was reserved in favor of the grantor, but is not conclusive. Economic 
consequences to both parties may be relevant indicators of their expectations. If 
existence of a servitude would severely limit the uses of the servient estate, and 
replacement of the utilities would not be very expensive, a servitude was 
probably neither intended or expected. Conversely, if replacement of the 
facilities would be very expensive, and the servitude's existence would have a 
negligible impact on the burdened estate, a servitude probably was intended or 
expected. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)§ 2.12 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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Applying the 
In this case, the parties agree that there was unity of title and that the Funks m:vned the 
portions agreed to be conveyed to Human Synergistics 1975. 
In July of 197 5, there was only one practical way to access the real property owned by the 
Funks in Section 21 and 22 and that was by using Signal Point Road. From Signal Point Road there 
was only one private road in existence for ingress and egress to the Funks' Section 21 and 22 
properties, the private road which is the subject of this lawsuit. 
The seven real estate sales agreements signed by the Funks and Human Synergistics show 
that both the buyer and sellers were aware of the access and the need for an easement for the benefit 
of the Funks. This fact is demonstrated by paragraph 5 of each sales contract which provides that 
the transfer ofland to Human Synergistics is "subject to ... an ingress egress easement." The grant of 
an easement to Human Synergistics is reflected in the phrase in paragraph 5 which states, "including 
an ingress egress easement." The facts presented in this case establish that the buyer, Human 
Synergistics, had knowledge of the easement road and the need for the use of the easement by both 
the buyer and seilers. (See Plainti:f:Ps Exhibits 5 -11, which are all dated July 10, 1975, a.,11d recorded 
as consecutive instrument numbers 672112 - 672118). 
While the language "subject to... an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining 
property in Said Sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor" was not enough to expressly convey an 
easement, it demonstrated the intent of the respective parties to allow the Funks to use the existing 
easement road off of Signal Point Road to access their remaining real property in Section 22. 
This coUi.-t recognizes that the intent of the parties to ti1.e transaction must either be 
established or implied. As explained in Davis v. Peacock, the requirement of proving "open and 
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to the severance dominant 
The Funks and Human Synergistics knew of the only existing easement and intended by 
their contract to make it permanent. There is no need to resort to inferences, presumptions, or legal 
fiction to imply an easement when the parties' actual intent is proven. As stated in Bird v. Bidwell, 
"[b ]ecause the intent to grant or reserve the easement is a necessary element, there is no logical 
reason to base the decision solely upon the grantee's presumed intent from prior use and to exclude 
other evidence of this intent." 147 Idaho 350,352,209 P.3d 647,649 (2009). 
Obviously, Human Synergistics had knowledge of the pre-existing use. As stated in Davis v. 
Peacock, "[ c ]onsequently it is equitable to impose an easement on a buyer who already had notice 
of its existence." 133 Idaho 637,641, 991 P.2d 362,366 (1999). 
As to the third requirement to prove an implied easement, that ''the easement must be 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate" the facts are uncontroverted 
that the road easement in question was the only access to the real property in the southeast comer of 
Section 22 at the time of severance in 1975. This court concludes the easement was reasonably 
necessary. 
3. An Implied Easement is Granted 
Spectra Site proved that it is entitled to an implied easement across the existing road on the 
Lawrences' real property in Section 21.4 This is an appurtenant easement and runs with the land. 
See Akers v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d 196, 205 (2005) (Akers I). 
4 The Lawrences want the court to ignore the actual intent of the parties as manifested in the seven sale agreements 
and consider only the number of times the Funks used their property to determine the actual intent and knowledge of 
the parties. This same argument was used in Bird, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647 (2009) and rejected. It would truly 
be a bitter irony to have the Funks and their successors precluded from having an implied easement when the 
buyer's and seller's knowledge reflected not only the existence of the actual easement road but the buyer's intent for 
its real property to be subject to the easement. 
0~(13082 100 of 136 
4. of the Easement 
court an easement 
1 V. 
1289, 1293 (1991), the Court stated, "the general rule concerning easements is that the right of an 
easement holder may not be enlarged and may not encompass more than is necessary to fulfill the 
easement." The Abbott Court, however, further expounds on scope by providing "an easement 
granted or reserved in general terms without any limitations as to its use, is one of unlimited 
reasonable use." Id. Therefore, as long as the use of the easement is reasonably necessary to 
provide access to the properties and tenants in Section 22, there are no strictures on such use and 
this court declines the invitation to impose restrictions at this stage of the proceedings. 
A practical consideration for the parties is the width of the easement. Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, 
which is a grant of easement from Idaho Forest Industries, Inc., to the Lawrences' predecessors in 
interest, Don E. Johnston and Fem A. Johnston (husband and wife) and John McHugh and Mary 
Anne McHugh (husband and wife) sets the easement width on the roadway at 40 feet in width. 
Further, on July 10, 1996, National Associated Properties ("NAP") signed an easement for ingress, 
egress, and utility purposes, for a road that was 40 feet in width (Plaintiff's Exhibit 22). NAP was a 
predecessor in interest of the Lawrences and t11e "easement" granted refers to the road in this case. 
Considering the snowfall that is faced by users, the need to clear a way through the snow so 
the road can be usable, the needs for access of equipment or cranes to service the site, and the 
previous recognition of the 40 foot wide roadway, the court establishes the width of the easement 
road through the Lawrences' real property as being 40 feet wide. 
of 136 
We turn next to appellants' assertion that they have an 
implied easement by "way of necessity." Such necessity can arise 
when the owner of land conveys part thereof to another, and the 
part conveyed is without ingress or egress except over the lands 
retained. Wagner v. Fairlamb, supra; Martino v. Fleenor, 148 
Colo. 136, 365 P.2d 247 (Colo.1961). The Idaho Supreme Court, 
quoting from Martino, and from 17 A Am.Jur. 668-69, Easements, 
§ 58, said in Burley Brick & Sand Company v. Cofer, 102 Idaho 
333,335,629 P.2d 1166, 1168 (1981): 
Although a way of necessity is sometimes confused with an 
easement arising, on severance of title, from a pre-existing use, 
there is a definite distinction between them, mainly because a way 
of necessity does not rest on a pre-existing use but on the need for 
a way across the granted or reserved premises. A way of necessity 
is an easement arising from an implied grant or implied 
reservation; it is a common-law origin and is supported by the rule 
of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of the 
application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case ... 
[I]t is [ of] a common-law origin and is supported by the 
rule of sound public policy that lands should not be rendered unfit 
for occupancy or successful cultivation. Such a way is the result of 
the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys 
property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use 
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial 
use of land he still possesses. Thus, the legal basis of a way of 
necessity is the presumption of a grant arising from the 
circumstances of the case. This presumption of a grant, however, is 
one of fact, and whether a grant should be implied depends upon 
the terms of the deed and the facts in each particular case. 
105 Idaho 71, 79,665 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Ct. App. 1983). 
1. The Material Elements an Easement by Necessity we:re Proven 
an easement 
easement 
severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." Machado v. Ryan, 15 3 Idaho at 219, 
280 P.3d at 722 (2012). 
The parties agree that there was unity of title when the Funks sold their property to 
Human Synergistics in July of 1975. 
As to the "reasonable" necessity at the time of severance, the facts as testified to by 
Darius Ruen and other witnesses firmly establish that there was only one way to access the 
Funks' remaining property in section 22 after it became landlocked and that was by way of 
Blossom Mountain Road, the road which is the subject of this litigation. The testimony is 
unequivocal that the Funks real property in section 22 was landlocked. Therefore, there was 
reasonable necessity at the time of severance in 1975. 
The last material element, "great present necessity for the easement" was also 
established. Presently, there is no other road or easement that provides access to the Halls' 
(Spectra Site's) parcel other than the easement road that passes through the Lawrences' real 
property in the southeast quarter of Section 21. 
2. Access to a Public Road 
In Capstar III, the Court provided: 
Nor is it entirely clear how the district court found the 
easement by necessity over the Lawrences' land when that 
easement would not, in fact, lead to a public road. As the 
Lawrences point out, Capstar did not have the legal right to travel 
over the road in Section 28 and where "land over which the way of 
necessity is claimed has no access to a public road," no necessity 
ca.ri arise. Rathbun v. Robson, 203 Mont. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 
(1983). Therefore, the district court erred in determining this issue 
on summary judgment because the conflicting evidence presented 
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proved an easement by necessity. 
at at 
Thus, in Capstar the Court seemingly added a fourth material element, that the party 
claiming an easement by necessity prove that the "way of necessity" results in "access to a 
public road." Id. 
Unlike Capstar, the Halls have an easement through section 28. This was acquired when 
Ida..li.o Forest Industries, Stimson Lumber's predecessor, granted a..11 easement to Nextel West 
Corp., its successors and assigns in 1997 (See Plaintiffs Exhibit 87). That document provided 
the Halls and their tenants legal access over Section 28. Thus, Spectra Site has access to a public 
road. Having proven all of the elements for an easement by necessity, Spectra Site is awarded an 
easement by necessity. 
C. Prescriptive Easement 
Having concluded that Spectra Site is entitled to both an implied easement and an 
easement by necessity, the issue of whether the plaintiff proved a right to a prescriptive easement 
is not necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Spectra Site proved its right to an easement which is 40 feet in width for ingress, egress, 
and utilities over and adjacent to the existing road across the Lawrences' property in section 21, 
Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Kootenai County Idaho. The centerline of the existing road 
shall be the centerline of the 40 foot wide easement. The easement shall be for unlimited 
reasonable use. 
In addition, Spectra Site is granted a permanent injunction. The Lawrences, their agents, 
servants, employees, and those persons in active concert or participation with the Lawrences are 
136 
interfering with, impeding, or preventing 
or 
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Capstar III adds an additional requirement for a 
claimant to prove it is entitled to an easement by necessity: that the easement results in access to 
a public road. As to its claim for an easement by necessity, Spectra Site did prove it had a legal 
right to use the land in Section 28 to obtain access to a public road. Having proven all material 
elements to establish an easement by necessity, such easement is ordered. 
Regarding Spectra Site's prescriptive easement allegations, the court determines that it is 
not necessary to decide this issue in light of the finding in favor of Spectra Site on the implied 
easement and easement by necessity issues. 
The court determines that Spectra Site is the prevailing party and awards costs to Spectra 
Site concerning the issues that were tried. 
To effectuate this decision, Spectra Site is ordered to conduct a survey of the easement as 
awarded on the real property in section 21 owned by the Lawrences and serve a copy of the 
completed survey to counsel for the Lawrences and provide a copy to the court. The Lawrences 
shall have 30 days upon receipt of the survey v\-1.thin which to object. If there is an objection the 
court will set the matter for hearing at a time convenient to both court and counsel. If there is no 
objection Spectra Site is ordered to submit a final judgment to the court for signature forthwith if 
no other court procee~ are required. 
Dated this L day of November, 2013; nunc pro tune to September 25, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
CASE NO.: CV 03-4621 
INTERMEDIATE JUDGMENT 
AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE, 
PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND 
DISMISSAL OF A PORTION OF 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Court having entered its substitute Memorandum Decision and Order herein, 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
1. The Cou..'1: hereby decrees that Plaintiffs landlord, Robert Hall, has an ingress and 
egress easement by prescription; an implied easement by implication, and an implied easement 
by necessity across Defendants' real property located in Section 21, Township 51 North, Range 5 
West, the scope of which is identical under all three easement theories. As a tenant of Robert 
Hall, Spectra Site has a right to utilize the easement to access the Hall parcel. Although the 
Court found the easement to be 40 feet in width, following issuance of the Memorandum 
INTERMEDIATE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE, PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION AND DISMISSAL OF A PORTION OF DEFENDANTS' 
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to easement more 
2. Douglas Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, their heirs, successors or assigns, their 
respective agents, servants, employees and persons in active concert or participation with them, are 
enjoined from interfering with, impeding, or preventing Spectra Site, its heirs, successors or assigns, 
agents, servants, contractors, employees or tenants from use or maintenance of the road traversing 
the Lawrence property more commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road, described in Exhibit 
"A" hereto. 
3, It is further decreed that Defendants' claim of trespass and request for injunctive 
relief prohibiting Plaintiff from utilizing the road are dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Defendants' remaining counterclaims shall be set for trial. 
DATED this 2 z..np{_,, day of , 2014. 
District Judge 
INTERMEDIATE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF QUIET TITLE, PERMANENT 
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on 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document 
to the following: 
Douglas Marfice 
Theron DeSmet 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Susan P. Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
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BLOSSOM MOUNTAIN ROAD 
30' ROAD EASEMENT 
That portion of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 21, 'township ;30 North, Range 5 
West, .801.se Meridian, Kootenai County, lclaho, more panic~Llarly described as follows· 
Commencing at iht: Southeast comer of Section 21, monumented by a 2 Vz" Zmc 
cap, thence westerly along the south line of said secnon, SouTh ~9°27• 43" West, 602-5 7 
feet: to me cc=nterline of Apple Blosijom MountaiI1 Ro!ld a.rui the POfNT OF 
BEGINNING. 
thence continuing along said sectit>n line South 89927'43" West, 15,03 f~t:t to the 
North right-of-way of Apple .BloSsom road, 
!hence [eaVing said section line and continumg along the said North rightAofwway 
the following courses and distances; 
thence 255.30 feet along a curve to thelighti ha.vfog a rad1u~ of7S0.23 feet, and a 
long chord that bears North 12°42'32'1 East, 254,07 feet; 
thence North 18°35) 46" East, I 64.80 feet; 
theni:e Nonh 26°21 '12" E~t, 43.85 feeti 
thence 157. 70 feet along a curve to 1be right, having a radius of 90.06 ft:et, and a 
long chord that beats North 79°21 130" Eai;;t, 138.32 feet; 
thence South 50<>55'04" East, 163.40 feet) 
thence Sourh 58°42122" East, 163,84 feet; 
thence Sou.th 61°12'45" East, S4 65 feet; 
rhence South 64°56>2ou East, 41.65 feet ro the East line of Section 21; 
thenc~ leaving said right~of-way along said Section hne South U0°l 9'03" East, 
33 20 feet to tht South nght"of~way of Apple Blossom Road; 
thence continuing along said righ1~of·way the following courses and distance; 
thence North 64ci56'20" West, 56.86 feet; 
chenc:e North 61 °l2'4S" West, 56.28 feer: 
thence Nonh 58°42'22" West, 166.54 feet; 
fhenc~ North 50°55'0311 West, 165.66 feet; 
thence l 04.52 fe~t alons a curve to lhe left having a radius of 60.06 fetl and a 
long chord whkh bears South 79"41 '04" West, 91.82 fte~; 
~hence South 26°21 '12" West, 40 99 fett, 
thence South 1S03S 146'' Wes1i 163.79 feet; 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 
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feijt along a curve 10 
bears South 12°49' l 8'' 
21; 
thence leaving said right-of-way Wei.;terly lllong, said Section line South 
89°27'43" W'est1 15.03 feet to tne POINT OF BEGINNTNG. 
Containing 0. 704 acr~s. more or less. 
END OF PESCRTPTlON 
Prepared by; 
)~U.·B ENG!NEERS, Inc. 
Ronald M. Hodge, P.L.S. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING 
COMP ANY, a Delaware corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
SPECTRA SITE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, 
a Delaware limited liability company, 
Plaintiffi'Counter Defendant, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Consolidated Case Nos. 
CV-02-7671 and CV-03-4621 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OFMOTIONFOR 
RECONSIDERTION 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
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cases. 
I. STANDARD 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 1(a)(2)(B) states that a motion for reconsideration of 
any order of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment or not 
later than 14 days· after the entry of final judgment. Rule 60(b) authorizes corrections of orders 
for mistakes or errors arisi.Dg from oversight or omission, as well as authorizing 
reconsideration ... "for reasons of mi stake, inadvertence, surprise ... or any other reason 
justifying relief" See, LR.C.P. 60(b)(6). This rule is interpreted as intending to allow a court to 
reconsider the legal basis for its original decision. See, First Bank and Trust v. Parker, 
Brothers, 112 Idaho 30, 730 P.2d 950 (1986). The court bas discretion to take additional 
evidence. 
II. ISSUES FOR RECONSIDERATION 
A. Standing 
In the January 2007 Supreme Court opinion in Tower Asset Sub. Inc. v. Lawrence, 
143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d 581 (2007) the Supreme Court held that because the plaintiff 
(Tower) was not in title ownership of the Hall parcel, it lacked standing to seek a quiet title 
determination. Since 2007, Capstar did not seek to amend to include Hall as a party 
defendant. Therefore, Capstar and SpectraSite lacked standing (like Tower before it) to seek 
to establish an appurtenant easement as to the Hall parcel. 
- - -
V/hile the plaintiffs may have standing to enforce the right to use an easement or to 
seek injunctive relief against interference with the right to use an easement; that is not the 
same thing as having standing to establish the easement itself. Here, plaintiffs did not have 
MEMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2 
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no assignment to a 
B. The Court erred in finding an easement by implication or necessity. 
In the 2012 Supreme Court opinion in Capstar v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,283 P.3d 
728 (2012) the Court held that because the road as it crosses the Lawrences' property does 
not reach a county road, no easement by necessity can arise. Necessity (in varying degrees) is 
a required element for both an easement by necessity and an easement implied by prior use. 
Harold Funk's deposition was the "best evidence" as to whether or not Mellick Road 
extended into his property. In his deposition testimony, Funk clearly acknowledges Mellick 
Road entering and extending into his property from the north. There was no evidence offered 
to overcome what Funk personally testified to. Since Funk's parcel had access (via Mellick 
Road) at the time he sold off what is now the Lawrence Property. There can be no :finding of 
necessity to access from the West/South on the purported easement. 
Funk also testified in deposition that he only visited the property 20-30 times over a 
six year period. In Capstar v. Lawrence, 53 Idaho 411 (2012), the Supreme Court stated that 
Funk's frequency of use did not rise to the level required to establish an easement implied by 
prior use. The evidence of Fink's frequency of use was the same evidence considered by the 
Supreme Court. The plaintiffs provided no evidence to overcome this. 
Easements by necessity are created .at the -time of the segregation of the "parent" -
parcel (dominant and servient estates). In this case, that occurred in 1975. In overcoming the 
lack an easement across Section 28 the Spectra Site case, Court ruled that a to 
MEMORA"NDlJM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
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was to ( someone other than landowner and sometime 
at 
severance. Funk testified (in his deposition) that he never obtained any rights across 
property in Section 28 prior to segregating his property. 
C. The Court erred in finding a prescriptive easement in favor of Capstar. 
There was no testimony that any of Lawrences' predecessors in title had any actual 
knowledge of use of the road by anyone. Both Farrnanian and McHugh testified that neither 
had any knowledge of anyone using the road. Furthermore, that they never saw anyone on the 
road. The element of notice required for a prescriptive easement was not established. 
The May 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the Lawrences did not have the burden 
to show Capstar's use was adverse; rather, Capstar had the burden to demonstrate the use was 
not permissive. Capstar presented no testimony at trial whatsoever to show that its use was 
adverse or hostile. Not one witness admitted to cutting locks or tearing down any gates. Not 
one witness provided any testimony establishing how their use of the road was hostile or 
adverse to Lawrences' use of the road. Not one w1tness testified to seeing or confronting 
Lawrence or any ofLawrences' predecessors. 
Every witness testifying to the use of the road, testified to the fact that the road was 
gated and locked on the Mead property but that access through it was freely given. Every 
witness testified to getting a key to that gate or permission to go through it. Having a key to a 
_gate _on the Mead propery .. clearly_ shows permissiye use of the road. The plaintiffs failed to 
provide any support for their contention that the permissive use of the Mead gate is not 
in establishing use of the road as it ·crosses Lawrences' parcel. 
l\IBMORANDUM lN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
Specta Site v Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket No. 43082 16 of 136 
cases and amend 
rt., 
DATED this __ -_day of June, 2014. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By ~,,('$?/~ -
Dougl S. Marfice, fthe Finn 
Attorneys for Defendants 
In recognition of the pending Motion to Withdraw filed on May 27, 2014 in the 
above-referenced matters, the undersigned Defendant certifies that he has read this motion 
and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, the motion is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing 
law and it is not interposed for any improper purpose. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2014. 
DEFEND At"\JT, 
Douglas Lawrence 
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Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks, P .A 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ !:{and Delivered 
_t/'_F1 acsimile (208) 664-1684 
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P. WEEKS 1 ISB #4255 
JAI\1ES, VERNON & WEEKS, 
Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
wl 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 




DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LA WREN CE, husband and wife, 
Defend an.ts. 
CASE NO.: CV 03-4621 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
The Court entered its final judgment on May 22, 2014. The Court held Spectrasite had 
proven a ri.ght to an implied easement, a prescriptive easement, and an easement by necessity. 
On June 4, 2014, Defendants filed their moti.on to reconsider. 
}ss 
6 
Defendants seek a reconsid.eration of the Court's decision and its judgment. Defendants 
argue that Spectrasite failed to prove the elements for an implied easement, a prescriptive 
easement and an easement by necessity. 
As an ini.ti.al. matter, Defendants seeks reconsideration of the judgment entered by the 
Court. Plaintiff concurs that the judgment requires amendment. In the proposed judgment 
submitted by Plaintjff, it was suggested that the Court in.elude the following language in the 
judgment: 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER: 
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Court hereby decrees that Plaintiffs landlord, Robert has an. 
ingress and egress easement by prescription; an implied easement by implication., 
and an implied easement by necessity across Defendants' :real property located 
Section 21, Township 51 North, Range 5 West, the scope of which is identi.cal 
under all tb:r.ee easement theories. As a tenant of Robert Hall, Spectrasite has a 
right to utilize the easement to access the Hall parcel. Although the Court fotmd 
the easement to be 40 feet in width, following issuance ofth.e Memorandum 
Decision and Order, the parties agreed to a reduced width. The scope of the 
easement is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached. hereto and. 
incorporated herein. 
PAGE 02/06 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that this language addresses the concern :raised by Defendants. 
Turning next to the easement by jmplication, in Capstar v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 41 l~ 283 
P .3d 728 (2012) (Capstar ll), our Supreme Court held "(i]f implied easements are based on the 
presupposition that the parties would not have agr.eed to this transaction except with some tacit 
understanding that an. easement would exist, that presupposition should arise at the time of the 
contract as that is when the understanding would arise. See 25 Am.Jur.2d Easements and 
Licenses § 24 ("The basis of the general principle as to the implication. of an easement from a 
pre-existjug use is the presumed or probable intenti.on. of the parties to the conveyance as 
disclosed by all the circumstances surrounding the transaction.") (Footn.otes omitted).'' Id, 283 
P .3d at 734. In this instance, the Court an.alysed the intention of the parties relying in. part on the 
recorded purchase agreement, which was recorded, and clearly set forth the intent of the parties 
to reserve to Funk an easement across the existing road. Defendant also argues that the Su.preme 
Court held in Capstar II that Funk's use of the road did 11.ot rise to the level of use to create an 
easement by implication.. TI1is argument is wrong. The Supreme Court specifically stated that 
"the record presents genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the Funks' use of the 
easement road was apparent and continuous and whether it was reasonably necessary to use the 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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at 
heard properly weighed disputed 
Defendants also contend that reasonable necessity to use the Blossom Mountain Road 
access did not exist in 1975 at the time of separation of the parcels because Funk identified 
Mellick Road as entering and extending into his property from the North when he purchased in. 
1969. Defendants cite to no specific portion of the deposition transcdpt to support this 
contention. lf one reads Funk's deposition in context, he never gave such definitive testimony. 
Funk's Jack of knowledge regarding the exi.stence of any road to the North ofh:is property, and 
the unrebutted testimony regarding Mellick Road consistin.g of Viewer Reports, Mack's affidavit 
testimony, the USGS maps, the testimony of indi.viduals who lived in the area ht the late 1960's 
and early l970's (including Tom. Loudi:n a1Jd Robert Hall) and the expert's testimony support the 
Court's fin.ding that Mellick Road never extended to Fun.k's property at the time of separ.a.tion. 
The trial testimony established that Mellick Road tennin.ated at a point of property not owned by 
Funk. 
Next, Defendants contend the Court erred in. finding Spectrasite established a prescriptive 
casem.ent. Defendants contend that McHugh and Fannanian testified they did not have actual 
knowledge of anyone actually using the road. Defendants argume11t ignores the sales agreement 
gave notice of Punk's intent to use the road, and to extend that ri.ght to his successors. McHugh 
testified he held the property as an. investment and did not visit it regularly, although the record 
shows notice was sent to him as an. adjacent landowner of cell towers bein.g placed on portions of 
the Funk parent parcel immediately east of his parcel through the years. Both McHugh and 
Fazman.ian acknowledged they physically had seen. that the road passed through their property to 
the east. The towers to the east are visible from their property. Further, Farmanian testified he 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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an easement was the access 
to successors were to get to 
The record demonstrates tbat Farmanian had actual knowledge and McHugh had imputed 
knowledge of use of the road. Further, as set forth by this Court in. its memorandum decision, 
the use of the road was open and notorious and should have put a property owner on notice that 
others were using the road. 
Further, contrary to Defendants' argum.ent, the Supreme Court did not nile jn Capstar JI 
that Spectrasite had the burden of proving their u.se was adverse. Rather, the Supreme Court 
noted in a footnote that from the record it had before it at that time, it appeared Lawrence's 
property was wild and unenclosed, giving rise to an inference that use was pennissive for 
purposes of the summary judgment. This footnote accompanied the statement of the Court there 
were disputed questions on material fact on the elements of a prescriptive easement. This Court 
had before it all of the evidence and testimony on tl1is issue, and this Court found based. upon the 
evidence that Lawrence's property was not wild and une:o.closed. 
Defendants also contend this Court erred in not finding that Spectrasite's use of the road 
was pennissive because Mead had a gate across the road a.sit traversed his property, and Mead 
provided road users with a key. Defendants fail to appreciate Mead's status as a servient estate 
in advancing this argument. Fuok. .had an express easement across Mead's property. A servient 
estate may gate an easement in Idaho if the servient estate does not prohibit the dominant estate 
from using the easement. See Lovittv. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 328~29, 78 P.3d 389, 395-96 
(2003). There is no case law that stands for the proposition if a servient estate exercises this 
right that it transfonns use of other parts of the road outside the casement i11to a permissive use. 
Defendants' argument is not supported by any case law. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
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Finally, Defendant argues 
not a to cross the at 
severance. 
In Capstar III, the Supreme Court cited with approval to Rathbun v. Robson, 203 
Mom. 319, 661 P.2d 850, 853 (1983). This Montana case in turn relied upon. Schmidv. 
McDowell, 649 P .2d 431 1 199 Mont. 233 (Mont. 1982), which held: 
Moreover, it bas also bee:n. held that a way of necessity cannot exist across 
land wb.i.ch had no access to a public road when the property was divided 
by the common grantor. Griffin v. North (Fla.App.1979), 373 So.2d 96. 
The rationale of this rule was expressed well in Daywalt v. Walker (1963), 
217 Cal.App.2d 669, 31 Cal.Rptr. 899, 903: ", .. If two parcels joined and 
temporariJy constituting one are both landlocked, an essential condition 
for the creation of a way of necessity is non.existent, because if both 
parcels are cut off from a public road, the basic :reason for the creation of a 
way of necessity, namely, to permit comm.uni cation with the outside 
world, is not present. 11 
Thts case draws to attention facts and analysis not addressed by the Supreme Court in 
Capstar Ill In Idaho, a prescriptive easement vests at the end of the prescriptive period, 
:n.ot upon declaration of a court. The only portion of the road used by Funk covered by an 
easement was the Mead parcel. Since Funk used the remainder of the road from 1969 
through 1975, including the portion that went across the IFI property, Funk had a vested 
prescriptive easement at the time of the severance in 1975. The evidence was clear that 
Funk's parcel always had access to Signal Point Road and was never cut off from the 
outside world d.ue to being landlocked prior to the severance. Although Defendants rai.se 
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point. 
JAMES VERN PAGI::. tlb/ l:'.lb 
JAMES) VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
~~f~_ 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of September, 2014, I caused to be served. a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method in.dicated below, and addressed to all counsel of 
record as follows: 
W. Jeremy Carr 
CJark and Feeney 
P0Box285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Hon. Steve Verby 
215 S. First Avenue 
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CASE NO. CV-03-4621 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER RE: 
1. MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME; 
AND 
2. MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiffs Motion for Enlargement of Time is granted. Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration is granted in part and denied in part. 
Susan Weeks, JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A., represented Plaintiff. 
W. Jeremy Carr, CLARK and FEENEY, represented Defendants. 
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I. 
a 
September 25, 2013. A substituted Memorandum Decision and Order was filed on November 
2013, due to a scrivener's error. 
On May 27, 2014, an Intermediate Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title, Permanent 
Injunction, and Dismissal of a Portion of Defendants' Counterclaims was entered. In the 
Intermediate Judgment, it was stated that Plaintiff Spectra Site, LLC's (Spectra Site) landlord, 
Robert Hall, has an ingress and egress easement, via an implied easement by prior use and an 
implied easement by necessity theories 1, through Defendants Douglas and Brenda Lawrences' 
(''the Lawrences") real property. Additionally, the Judgment provided that Spectra Site, as a 
tenant of Robert Hall, had a right to utilize the easement to access Robert Hall's property. 
Further, although the finding was made that the easement was forty ( 40) feet in width, the 
decision was changed to provide for an easement thirty (30) feet in width based upon the 
stipulation of the parties. An injunction was also entered which permanently enjoined the 
Lawrences from interfering, impeding, or preventing Spectra Site from using or maintaining the 
easement, which is commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Lastly, the Lawrences' 
trespass claim and request for injunctive relief were dismissed. 
A three-day jury trial is scheduled to commence on November 5, 2014, on the 
Lawrences' breach of contract counterclaim. 
On June 4, 2014, the Lawrences filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a supporting 
brief. On September 3, 2014, Spectra Site filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time and a 
responsive brief that opposed the Motion for Reconsideration. On September 4, 2014, the parties 
1 A determination as to a prescriptive easement was not made because Spectra Site was already found to have a right 
to use the Hall's easement by implication (prior use) and necessity. 
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came on for took matters under 
ll(a)(2)(B) provides that motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory 
orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later 
than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment." 
In Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,281 P.3d 103 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court 
provided: 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a 
motion for reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure l l(a)(2)(B). On a motion for reconsideration, the court 
must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on 
the correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion for 
reconsideration need not be supported by any new evidence or 
authority. When deciding the motion for reconsideration, the 
district court must apply the same standard of review that the court 
applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. 
In other words, if the original order was a matter within the trial 
court's discretion, then so is the decision to grant or deny the 
motion for reconsideration. If the original order was governed by a 
different standard, then that standard applies to the motion for 
reconsideration. 
153 Idaho at 276, 281 P.3d at 113 (citations omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Spectra Site's Motion for Enlargement of Time 
Spectra Site's Motion for Enlargement of Time was not addressed at the September 4, 
2014, hearing. Its motion, however, was filed before the hearing date and the Lawrences did not 
provide any written or oral objection. In reviewing Spectra Site's supporting brief, it provides 
reasoning that shows good cause and excusable neglect as required by LR.C.P. 6(b) to support an 
extension of time to fJe the responsive brief to the Lavvrences' Motion for Reconsideration. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 3 
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Spectra supporting it was not served with the 
been shortly 
cause 
having received no objection, the Court in its discretion grants Spectra Site's Motion for an 
Enlargement of Time. 
B. The Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration 
The Lawrences request reconsideration based upon three issues: (1) Spectra Site had no 
standing to seek quiet title; (2) the Court erred in finding an implied easement by prior use; and 
(3) the Court erred in finding an easement by necessity. 
1. Spectra Site did not have standing to quiet title; however. Spectra Site did have 
standing to seek injunctive relief. 
The Lawrences argue that the Idaho Supreme Court held that because Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc., Spectra Site's predecessor in this case, did not hold record title to the Hall parcel, it lacked 
standing to seek a quiet title determination. Further, they contend that Spectra Site never 
amended its pleading to include Hall as a party defendant. As such, the Lawrences posit that 
Spectra Site lacked standing to seek to establish an appurtenant easement as to the Hall parcel. 
See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at page 2. 
Our Supreme Court, in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence (Fower I) stated, 
This Court has established that title ownership is a 
prerequisite to quiet title to an easement appurtenant in 
favor of a dominant estate. However, we agree with the 
Restatement (Third) of Property that an individual has 
standing to enforce the right to use an easement if he or she 
has the right to benefit from the easement. Therefore, title 
ownership of the dominant estate is not a necessary 
prerequisite to obtain standing to enforce the right to use an 
easement. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 4 
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Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record 
owner of alleged estate. a 
standing to seek a quiet title declaration 
vU..4.LLUJ..UF, to enforce to use an 
to benefit 
easement, Tower will have standing to seek injunctive 
relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right to 
benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement. As 
lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives its 
right to use the alleged easement from its lessor, Hall. 
We hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged 
dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief 
preventing the Lawrences from interfering with its alleged 
right to use the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet 
title to the easement. 
143 Idaho 710, 713, 152 P.3d 581, 584 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). In the 
present matter, this Court addressed the issue of the Halls having an easement2 but erroneously 
said in the Memorandum Decision and Order that Spectra Site had proven a right to an implied 
easement and an easement by necessity. Additionally, the Intermediate Judgment states that 
Robert Hall had obtained an easement through the Lawrences' property. Because Hall could not 
have his easement properly quieted in this lawsuit as he was not a party, the Court grants the 
Lawrences' Motion for Reconsideration as to this issue. 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Tower I, Spectra Site does not have standing 
to quiet title to an easement appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate as it does not have record 
ownership of the Hall property. Thus, Specta Site lacks standing to seek a quiet title declaration 
in its favor. The November 7, 2013, Memorandum Decision and Order is hereby modified by 
the following clarification: 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs landlord, Robert Hall, has an easement for all purposes 
2 As an example, the Court stated, "the Halls have an easement through section 28." Memorandum. Decision and 
Order at page 24. 
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use as a result implication an implied 
easement 
easement a 
tenant of Robert Hall, Spectra has a right to utilize the easement to access the Hall parcel. As 
decided in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 713, 152 P.3d 581, 584 (2007), 
title ownership is not a necessary prerequisite to have standing to enforce the right to use an 
easement. Spectra Site has standing to seek injunctive relief as it proved it has a legal right to 
benefit from Hall's Blossom Mountain Road easement. Spectra Site derives its right to use the 
easement from its lessor, Hall. Therefore, Spectra Site is granted a permanent injunction. The 
Lawrences, their agents, servants, employees, and those persons in active concert or participation 
with the Lawrences are enjoined and precluded from interfering with, impeding, or preventing 
Spectra Site, its agents, servants, contractors, or employees from using, developing, maintaining, 
improving, and/or servicing the easement. 
2. The evidence proved an implied easement by prior use. 
The Lawrences argue that Harold Funk ("Funk") testified in his deposition that his parcel 
had access to what is now the Lawrences' property via Mellick Road. As sue~ the Lawrences 
assert the necessity element has not been satisfied. Further, the Lawrences take the position that 
because Funk testified that he only visited his property 20-30 times over a six year period, and as 
the Idaho Supreme Court, in Capstar 111, concluded that Funk's frequency of use did not rise to 
the level required to establish an implied easement by prior use, no easement could be found to 
exist. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration at pages 2-3. These 
arguments are addressed separately in this section of the memorandum decision. 
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a. Mellick Road 
were: 
Testimony and exhibits were admitted concerning 
the existence of Mellick Road and whether it provided 
access to the Funks through Section 15. After a review of 
the evidence presented, the court finds that the developed 
portion of Mellick Road did not extend to the Funk's real 
property in Section 15 in 1975. This factual/legal finding is 
based on the testimony of Darius Ruen, who was 
meticulous, precise, and inherently believable. Mr. Ruen's 
testimony was buttressed by other witness testimony. The 
court adopts Mr. Ruen's testimony as being wholly credible 
and fmds that the facts to which he testified are controlling. 
The court further fmds that those facts contradict the 
testimony of any defense witnesses as well as any facts 
testified to by Mr. Lawrence concerning access by way of 
Mellick Road. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pages 9-10. Further, the Memorandum Decision 
stated, 
As to the third requirement to prove an implied 
easement, that ''the easement must be reasonably necessary 
to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate" the facts 
are uncontroverted that the road easement in question was 
the only access to the real property in the southeast comer 
of Section 22 at the time of severance in 1975. This court 
concludes the easement was reasonably necessary. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at page 20. Despite the Lawrences' contention to the 
contrary, the trial testimony established that Mellick Road terminated on property which was not 
owned by Funk. There was sufficient evidence presented to support the Court's conclusion that 
the necessity element was satisfied. The Lawrences did not bring forth any additional evidence to 
support their argument that Funk's deposition testimony was the "best evidence" as to whether or 
not Mellick Road extended into his property. The Lawrences' argument on the Mellick road 
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was rejected Memorandum Decision and Order and it is rejected again now. 
[T]he record presents genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether the Funks' use of the easement road was 
apparent and continuous and whether it was reasonably 
necessary to use the Blossom Mountain access road to 
reach their property in Section 22. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company, 153 Idaho 411, 417, 283 P.3d 728, 734 (2012). 
While there were genuine issues of material fact in existence as to the easement road's usage 
when the matter was before our Supreme Court at the summary judgment stage of the 
proceedings, this Court resolved those issues at trial in its role as the trier of fact, and 
determined that the "usage" element was satisfied. A detailed analysis of this conclusion is 
contained in the Memorandum Decision and Order at pages 11-15 and 17-20. 
3. The evidence proved an easement by necessity. 
The Lawrences believe that this Court ruled that a right to cross Section 28 was given to 
Nextel, which is what created a necessity. However, the Lawrences assert that the right to cross 
Section 28 did not exist at the time of severance (1975) because Funk testified that he never 
obtained any rights prior to his segregation of his property. 
In the Memorandum Decision and Order, it states: 
Unlike Capstar, the Halls have an easement through section 
28. This was acquired when Idaho Forest Industries, 
Stimson Lumber's predecessor, granted an easement to 
Nextel West Corp., its successors and assigns in 1997 (See 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 87). That document provided the Halls 
and their tenants legal access over Section 28. Thus, 
Spectra Site has access to a public road. Having proven all 
of the elements for an easement by necessity, Spectra Site 
is awarded an easement by necessity. 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Reconsideration 8 
Specta Sile Douglas Lawrence, et al Docket 43082 132 of 136 
Memorandum 
through 1975. The road traversed through Idaho Forest Industries' property. As such, there was 
a right to use the road in 197 5. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, while Spectra Site did not have standing to seek to 
"quiet title" in its name to the easement, it did have standing to seek injunctive relief. Because 
Robert Hall, the owner of the real property, acquired an easement by implication (prior use) and 
by necessity, Spectra Site, as Hall's tenant, may use the road without interference from the 
Lawrences. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration is 
granted in part and denied in part as provided above. 
Dated this ~ay ofNovember, 2014. 
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